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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There are two questions presented for review: 
1. Whether the applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953), may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
2. Whether a Utah general partnership, through its 
managing partner who has both actual and constructive notice of a 
pending quiet title action affecting seven acres of real property 
subject to an executory real estate contract, can continue to 
make payments on that property and acquire legal title to the 
property, while the quiet title action is still pending, from an 
interloper whose interest in the seven acres is directly 
challenged in the quiet title action and whose interest is 
ultimately stipulated by the managing partner, through his 
attorney, to be nothing and judgment is entered accordingly. 
The panel of the Court of Appeals has tacitly decided 
that the applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
may not be raised for the first time on appeal. This tacit 
decision is in conflict with Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline 
Construction, 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988). 
Furthermore, the panel of the Court of Appeals has 
tacitly decided that one who continues to make payments on real 
property subject to an executory real estate contract and 
acquires legal title to that property, while the quiet title 
action is still pending, from an interloper whose interest in the 
property is directly challenged in the quiet title action and 
whose interest is ultimately determined to be nothing, acquires 
that legal title to the property regardless of the disposition of 
that property made by the trial court. This tacit decision is in 
conflict with these decisions of the Utah Supreme Court: 
Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982); 
Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 590 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1979); and 
Glynn v. Dubin, 369 P.2d 930 (Utah 1962). 
This tacit decision is also in conflict with this decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals: 
Biodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P. 2d 901 
(Utah App. 1988) . 
This tacit decision seriously affects the integrity of 
judicial proceedings in rem. Property which is before the trial 
court for disposition can be validly alienated away by one before 
the court whose interest is ultimately determined to be nothing 
to another who has both actual and constructive notice of those 
in rem proceedings while those proceedings are still pending. 
CITATION TO OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The opinion of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals 
can be found at 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1990). 
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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The decision of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals 
was entered in this case on October 19, 1990. No rehearing was 
requested* No order granting an extension of time within which 
to petition for certiorari has been entered. 
Section 78-2-2(b), Utah Code Ann. (1989), is believed 
to confer jurisdiction upon the Utah Supreme Court to review the 
decision in question by a writ of certiorari. 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides: 
In any action affecting the title to, or 
the right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative relief 
is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the 
recorder of the county in which the property 
or some part thereof is situated a notice of 
the pendency of the action, containing the 
names of the parties, the object of the 
action or defense, and a description of the 
property in that county affected thereby. 
From the time of filing such notice for 
record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer 
of the property affected thereby be deemed to 
have constructive notice of the pendency of 
the action, and only of its pendency against 
parties designated by their real names. 
(Emphasis added*) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action to quiet title to seven acres of real 
property located in Summit County, Utah. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
1. On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major ("Weber")1 filed 
a complaint to quiet title to eleven parcels of real estate 
located in Summit County. Snyderville West ("Snyderville"), a 
Utah general partnership, and Jim Gaddis ("Gaddis"), 
Snyderville' s managing partner, were two of seventy named 
defendants. (R. 0001-0021; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40) 
2. On April 11
 r 1983, Weber recorded a Lis Pendens 
describing the eleven parcels of real property. By Order entered 
March 19, 1990, Judge Regnal W. Garff of the Utah Court of 
Appeals granted Plaintiff/Appellant fs Motion to Supplement the 
Record to include the lis pendens. The seven acres were 
described as Parcel 6 in the Lis Pendens. (R. 0664-0682: 1 4; 
Appendix wA,f hereto) 
1. Steven W. Major died and Brenda Major Weber was named as 
successor Personal Representative in 1984. (R. 0378-0383; 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, ft. 1) 
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3. By order dated December 17, 1983, the trial court 
allowed service by publication upon Snyderville and sixteen other 
named defendants. Counsel for Weber could not determine the 
identity of any agent to serve on Snyderville*s behalf, (R. 
0264-0282; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 and 43, ft. 6) 
4. The trial court entered a default judgment against 
Snyderville on August 29, 1985. (R. 0432-0435, 0444-0454; 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) 
5. On October 2, 1985, following lengthy negotiations 
among twenty-six of the developer defendants, Gaddis, through his 
attorney, entered into a complex Stipulation for Settlement 
providing that the seven acres vest in Weber. (R. 0479-0525) 
6. On January 17, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting 
title to the seven acres in Weber. (R. 0552-0572: If 2 and 3-
Exhibit nCM thereto; R. 0837-0966: ff 8, 11 and 12) 
C. Disposition in The Lower Courts 
1. In the fall of 1988, Snyderville sought to have 
the default judgment against it set aside. (R. 0573-0633, 0637-
09 77; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) The district court determined 
that there was "no adequate explanation . . . [for the] failure 
to personally serve Snyderville West at its known tax address" 
and set aside the judgment. (R. 0979-0989; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
41) 
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2. In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss 
premised on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), 
which was granted. (R. 0996-1022; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) 
3. This appeal followed. (R. 1023-1029; 146 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 41) 
4. A panel of the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the 
trial court, holding that: 1) service of process upon Jim Gaddis 
in his individual capacity did not effect service of process 
upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, Snyderville; 2) service by 
publication was inappropriate where no personal inquiry was made 
at Snydervillefs last known address within the state; 3) since 
service by publication on Snyderville was not warranted, such 
service was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over 
Snyderville and the default judgment against it was void; and 4) 
Weber raised no argument demonstrating error in dismissal on Rule 
12(b)(5) grounds. (146 Utah Adv. Rep. 40-43) 
5. The panel found no merit in Weber's lis pendens 
argument, raised for the first time in her reply brief. (146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, ft. 3) 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. From 1978 to the present, Gaddis has held a ten 
percent interest in Snyderville and has been its managing 
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partner. (R. 0664-0682: %% 1 and 2; R. 1031: 11-14; R. 0582-
0633, Exhibit "A" thereto (R. 0598); 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40) 
2. For $120,000, in 1978, Snyderville purchased from 
Investor Associates seven acres, a portion of the property at 
issue in the quiet title action. Robert W. Major {"Major") 
executed the pertinent real estate contract on behalf of Investor 
Associates. Major died on March 20, 1980. Immediately 
thereafter, Joseph L. Krofchek ("Krofchelc"), an interloper, 
purportedly transferred to himself all right, title and interest 
in property belonging to Investor Associates, including the seven 
acres. Snyderville took possession of the seven acres in 1978 
and made timely payments until Major's death; thereafter, 
payments continued, albeit to different payees, with the final 
payment of $32,210.10 being made on July 10, 1983. In October 
1983, Snyderville recorded a warranty deed for the seven acres 
given to it by Joseph L. Krofchek. In the quiet title action 
Krofchek's interest was directly challenged and was ultimately 
stipulated by Gaddis, through his attorney to be nothing. (R. 
0001-0021: 11 1, 8-10, 14-17 Exhibit "B" thereto; R. 1031: 23-
30, Exhibits 3, 6, 7 and 8 thereto; R. 0479-0525, 0552-0572, 
0526-0551; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40) 
3. Weber paid the real property taxes on the seven 
acres for the years 1986 and 1987. (R. 0664-0682: 1 12; 
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R. 0653-0658: % 3) When it paid the real property taxes in 
1987, Snyderville learned that the trial court had divested it of 
title by means of the default judgment against it. (R. 0600; 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40) 
4. From the time it took possession of the subject 
property in 1978, Snyderville1s address had been correctly listed 
as Gaddisfs office address on the Summit County tax records. (R. 
0274, 0279, 0600, 0992, 0995; R. 1030: 38-39; R. 1031: 13-14; 146 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40-41) 
5. No filing in the appropriate county or state 
offices revealed the name of any individual affiliated with 
Snyderville nor did Snyderville have a telephone directory 
listing. Although Gaddis was served in his individual capacity 
at his office on May 11, 1983, the summons served upon him was 
directed to him individually and made no reference to Snyderville 
except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy defendants. 
The return of service indicated that Gaddis had been served 
personally and did not purport that service on Snyderville had 
been effected through him. By order dated December 17, 1983, the 
trial court allowed service by publication upon Snyderville and 
sixteen other named defendants. (R. 1031: 13-15, 22, 32-33, 
Exhibit 11 thereto; R. 0664-0682: 1 3; R. 0731-0825, Exhibit "A" 
thereto; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) 
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6. As a corollary to service by publication, counsel 
for Weber prepared a summons for mailing to Snyderville at its 
tax address, i.e., Gaddisfs office at 1253 East 2100 South in 
Salt Lake City. (R. 1030: 50-54; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41) 
7. The affidavit of mailing listed Snydervillefs 
address as "1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly stating the south 
coordinate by fifty blocks. Although there is no such address, 
and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the 
summons directed to Snyderville should have been returned by the 
Postal Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that the summons 
had been returned, although other summonses were returned. The 
Postal Service does not keep records of returned first class mail 
and it is therefore unknown if the mailed summons ever reached 
Snyderville. Gaddis had no recollection of receiving a summons 
through the mail. (R. 0300-0330, 1 4(e); R. 1030: 13, 54-55; R. 
0714-0715; R. 0600; R. 1031: 44-45; R. 0736-0737; 146 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 41) 
8. The trial court entered a default judgment against 
Snyderville on August 29, 1985. Pursuant to negotiations and the 
Stipulation for Settlement entered by Gaddis, through his 
attorney, on January 26, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting 
title to the seven acres in Weber. In the fall of 1988, 
Snyderville sought to have the judgment set aside. The district 
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court determined that there was "no adequate explanation . . . 
[for the] failure to personally serve Snyderville West at its 
known tax address" and set aside the judgment. In 1989, 
Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss premised on Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which was granted. This appeal followed. 
(See %% B.4, B.5, B.6, C.l, C.2 and C.3 hereinabove - Course of 
Proceedings and Disposition In The Lower Courts) 
9. On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Weber 
claimed that Snyderville was effectively served through personal 
service upon Jim Gaddis or, alternatively, that it was properly 
served by publication. Weber challenged the trial court's order 
of dismissal in favor of Snyderville as improper under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). In her reply brief, Weber also claimed that 
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), was determinative of the 
action. (See %% C*4 and C*5 hereinabove - Disposition in The 
Lower Courts) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPLICABILITY OF A STATUTE MAY 
BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL. 
In Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 
754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988), Judge Orme addressed whether a 
statute's inapplicability could be raised for the first time on 
10 
appeal. Together with Judge Bench and Judge Howard, Judge Orme 
wrote: 
. Appellants have raised for the 
first time on appeal the inapplicability of 
the procurement code. Ordinarily, arguments, 
positions, and issues may not be raised for 
the first time on appeal. See, e.g., 
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 
1983); Conder v. A. L. Williams & Assocs., 
Inc. , 739 P.2d 634, 637 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987. That doctrine is not, however, applied 
in a vacuum. Where some countervailing 
principle is to be served, the doctrine must 
occasionally yield. See, e.g., UWC Assoc, v. 
Home Sav. & Loan, 78 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 8 
(1988). 
754 P.2d at 674 
In Cox, appellants raised for the first time on appeal 
the inapplicability of the Utah Procurement Code, Section 63-56-1 
to -73, and its payment bond requirements, Section 14-1-13, Utah 
Code Ann. Judge Orme compared the circumstances in Cox to the 
case of Robbins v. Sonoma County Flood Control & Water Cons. 
District, 138 Cal. 291, 292 P.2d 52, 56 (Cal. App. 1956): 
. . . [A] pleading must be tested, not 
by what it says as to the effect of [public 
laws and public acts], but by the contents of 
the laws and acts themselves." 
754 P.2d at 675. 
See also Maynard Investment Co. v. McCann, 465 P.2d 657, 660-661 
11 
(Wash. 1970); and Huntress v. Huntress1 Estate, 235 F.2d 205, 209 
(7th Cir. 1956). 
In Cox, Judge Orme examined the contents of the 
statutes themselves, held that they were not applicable and 
reversed the decision of the trial court. The case was remanded 
for a determination of whether additional evidence should be 
received. 
In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) 
Judge Garff articulated principles for determining when and under 
what circumstances a new issue might be considered: 
. . . In Utah, matters not raised in the 
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial may 
not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P. 2d 754, 
758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire 
Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). A 
matter is sufficiently raised if it has been 
submitted to the trial court and the trial 
court has had the opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law. See Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc. , 
645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). "Theories or 
issues which are not apparent or reasonably 
discernible from the pleadings, affidavits 
and exhibits will not be considered." 
Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 835, 
838 (Wyo. 1977). In particular, even if 
pleadings are generously interpreted, if they 
are not supported by any factual showing or 
by the submission of legal authority, they 
are not presented for decision. Intf 1 
Business Mach. Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 
194, 677 P. 2d 507, 510 (1964). Further, the 
rule that a legal theory may not be raised 
for the first time on appeal is "to be 
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stringently applied when the new theory 
depends on controverted factual questions 
whose relevance thereto was not made to 
appear at trial." Boqacki v. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537, 
543-44, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657, 663-64 (1971), 
cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1301, 
31 L.Ed.2d 488 (1972); see also Campbell v. 
Graham-Armstrong, 9 Cal.3d 482, 509 P.2d 689, 
107 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1973); Church v. Roemer, 
94 Idaho 782, 498 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1972). 
In order for a theory to be considered on appeal, then, 
certain requirements must be met: 
1. The matter must have been either raised in the 
pleadings or put in issue at trial. 
2. If a matter is put at issue and submitted to the 
trial court, the trial court must have had an opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law. 
3. The theory or issue must be apparent or reasonably 
discernible from the pleadings. 
4. A matter raised in a pleading must be supported 
either by a factual showing or the submission of legal authority. 
5. The theory or issue must not depend on facts that 
could have been controverted before the trial court. 
Here 
In this case, the matter of the Lis Pendens having been 
recorded on April 11, 1983 was raised in Paragraph 4 of Weber's 
June 3, 1988 Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
13 
Defendant Snyderville West's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. (R. 0664-0682, % 4) 
The fact that the Lis Pendens had been recorded was a 
basic given before the trial court. Whether it had been recorded 
was never at issue. 
The doctrine of lis pendens is readily discernible from 
the undisputed fact that the Lis Pendens was recorded. The Lis 
Pendens was recorded pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-40-
2. The contents of that statute expressly set forth the doctrine 
of lis pendens. 
In its June 24, 1988 trial court Memorandum in 
Response, Snyderville did not dispute the fact that the Lis 
Pendens had been recorded. (R. 0731-0825) In fact, on March 20, 
1990 Snyderville acknowledged before the Court of Appeals that 
the April 11, 1983 Lis Pendens was "a document incontrovertibly 
of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office." (Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant/Respondent 
Snyderville West's Motion to Disregard or Strike Reply Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellant, p. 4 — Appendix MCW hereto) Snyderville1s 
failure to dispute Weber's assertion that the Lis Pendens had 
been recorded amounted to a factual showing by Weber of the truth 
of that assertion. Utah law does not require that the recorded 
Lis Pendens be filed in the action of which it gives notice. 
14 
Snyderville could not hstve controverted the fact of the 
Lis Pendens having been recorded. The document was 
uncontrovertibly of record in the Summit County Recorder's 
Office. 
Weber's Reply Brief presented a purely legal issue to 
the Court of Appeals: Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
governed the action. Where a purely legal issue is raised in a 
case for the first time before an appellate court, that case 
should be governed by the applicable law. See, e.g. , Vintero 
Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 675 F.2d 513, 515 (2d 
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (five cases from various circuits cited 
as authority for appellate consideration of new issues if 
additional facts not required, or pure legal issue involved; 
unjust enrichment issue considered when only argument for 
imposition of constructive trust raised below); Ricard v. Birch, 
529 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1975) (application of tolling statute 
could be raised for first time on appeal as exception to rule of 
nonreviewability) ; Burns v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 265 
Cal. App. 2d 98, 105-06, 71 Cal. Rptr. 326, 330 (1968) (court 
cited three prior decisions as precedent for permitting new 
issues of law to be raised first on appeal); Cronin v. Lindberg, 
66 111. 2d 47, 61, 360 N.E.2d 360, 366 (1976) (citing two prior 
decisions that allowed exceptions based on public importance of 
15 
legal issues to be raised on appeal); People ex rel. Sterba v. 
Blaser, 33 111. App. 3d 1, 10-11, 337 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1975) 
(court referred to one prior holding to support new legal issue 
being raised when all pertinent facts were before the court); 
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1969) (in 
interest of judicial economy, applicability of Voting Rights Act 
provision not precluded from consideration by failure to raise 
issue below where all facts undisputed); Telco Leasing, Inc. v. 
Transwestern Title Co., 630 F.2d 691, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(where issue purely one of law and not affected by factual record 
below appellate court has discretion to consider for first time 
application of correct state statute concerning attorney's fees); 
Zinn v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 148 Cal. App. 2d 56, 82-83, 306 P.2d 
1017, 1034 (1957) (court permitted application of conflict of 
laws doctrine for first time on appeal); Hiqqinbotham v. Ford 
Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976). "[T]he new theory 
raises a purely legal question. No facts could have been 
developed to aid our resolution of the issue. . . . Under these 
circumstances, we believe it would be unjust now to refuse to 
consider the new argument." Id. at 768 n.10. The Supreme Court 
of California stated: lf[W]hen as here the facts with reference 
to the contention newly made on appeal appear to be undisputed 
and that probably no different showing could be made on a new 
16 
trial it is deemed appropriate to entertain the contention as a 
question of law on the undisputed facts and pass on it 
accordingly," Panopulos v. Maderls, 47 Cal. 2d 337, 341, 302 
P. 2d 738, 740 (1956); Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 24 Cal- App. 3d 35, 43, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791, 797 
(1972) (court permitted new argument based on provision of 
California Labor Act when all pertinent facts were before the 
court), afffd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). 
This is such a case. The integrity of the judicial 
process in an in rem proceeding should not be subverted by 
allowing an interloper who is a party to that proceeding to put 
property beyond the trial court's jurisdiction by means of a 
spurious deed to a general partnership whose managing partner has 
both actual and constructive notice that the property is before 
the court for disposition. 
This Court should issue a Writ of Certiorari to the 
Utah Court of Appeals to review and reverse that court's 
erroneous decision not to consider Weber's lis pendens argument. 
POINT II. 
BY VIRTUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIS 
PENDENS SET FORTH IN SECTION 7 8 - 4 0 -
2 , U T A H CODE A N N . ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 
S N Y D E R V I L L E WAS BOUND BY THE 
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT AND THE 
JANUARY 1 7 , 1986 JUDGMENT VESTING 
TITLE TO THE SEVEN ACRES IN WEBER. 
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The argument supporting this point is set forth in 
Point I of the Reply Brief of Appellant, which is included as 
Appendix "D" to this Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953) and the doctrine of lis pendens contained therein is a 
purely legal issue which should have been considered by the panel 
of the Court of Appeals. Snyderville could not have disputed the 
fact of the Lis Pendens having been recorded on April 11, 1983. 
The Court of Appeals ordered that Weber's Motion to Supplement 
the Record to include the Lis Pendens be granted. 
This Court should grant Weber's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari to preserve the integrity of the judicial process in 
quiet title proceedings. 
DATED: November 19, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted 
ROBERT/J. 0RT0N ^ ~ ^ — ^ 
VIRGINIA C. LEE 
MARSDEN, 0RT0N, CAH00N & QOTTFREDSQN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Hand delivered four (4) copies of this Petition of 
Plaintiff/Appellant for Writ of Certiorari to: 
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Richard A, Rappapoct, Esq, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Fifth Floor 
525 East First South 
P.O. Box 11008 
jfP Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
this >9th day of November, 1990. Pursuant to Rules 45 through 49 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, each of those four (4) 
copies indicated on its cover the date of filing of the Petition 
and the Certiorari Docketing Number of the Utah Supreme Court. 
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APPENDIX 
Order and Motion to Supplement Record 
Opinion of the Panel of the Utah Court of Appeals; 146 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 40. 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendant/Respondent Snyderville West's Motion to Disregard 
or Strike Reply Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant 
Reply Brief of Appellant (Addendum "F" omitted) 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Brenda Major Webb, 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Robert W. Major, 
Sr,. Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
English Inn Co., Inc., a 
Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants, 
and 
Snyderville West, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
This matter is before the court on appellant's motion to 
supplement the record and respondent's motion to strike 
portions of appellant's reply brief. Respondent has filed an 
objection to the motion to supplement the record. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion to supplement the 
record is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the motion to strike portions 
of appellant's reply brief is deferred until plenary 
presentatiorLjand consideration of the case. 
ORDER 
Case No. 890599-CA 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of March, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail. 
Robert F. Orton 
Virgina Curtis Lee 
Marsden, orton & Cahoon 
Attorneys at Law 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Richard A. Rappaport 
William B. Wray, Jr., 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
525 East First South 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
DATED this 16th day of March, 1990. 
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ROBERT F. ORTON - //A2 4 83 
VIRGINIA C. LEE - #19 2 3 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, FIFTH FV.OOK 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 34 101 
TELEPHONE: (801) f>2 I - 3HOO 
COURT OF APPEALS 
.STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBEU, 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of ROBERT to. 
MAJOR, SR., Deceased, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
Case No. 8905'99-CA 
District Court 
No. 7325 
Priority: 14(b) 
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a 
Utah corporation, et a.l . , 
Defendants, 
and 
SNYDERVILLE WEST, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, P.l a 1 n t i f f ' Appe.l 1 ant Brenda Major Weber, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., Deceased, 
by and through counsel , hereby moves this Court for an Order 
Supplementing the Record on Appeal to include the Lis Pendens 
recorded with respect t>> this action on April 11, 1983. This 
Motion is brought for the following reasons: 
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1. In hur Statement of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Defendant Snyderville West's Motion to Set Aside 
1 I  Default Judgment, the Pergonal Representative set forth in the 
2 Statement of Facts thai: on the 11th day of April, 1983, a Lis 
3 Pendens was recorded in the office of the Recorder of Summit 
4 County, State of Utah with respect to said action. (R. 0664-
5 0682, 1 4 ) 
6 2 o In its Memorandum in Response, Snyderville West 
7 did not dispute this fact. (R. 0731-0825) 
8 I 3. In her Brief of Appellant, the Personal 
Representative again stcrU-t; the fact that on April 11, 1983, the 
Personal Representative caused a Lis Pendens regarding the quiet 
title action to be recorded in the Summit County Recorder's 
Office. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 18) 
4. In its Brief of Respondent, Snyderville West does 
not dispute this fact. 
5. Sod .inn 7H-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides 
for filing a lis pendens for record with the recorder of the 
county in which the property is situated, but does not require a 
copy of the lis pendens to be filed with the court in which the 
action is pending.. 
6. The: Lis Pendens recorded with respect to this 
action was styled as a pleading in the action and a copy is 
attached as Exhibit "A" hereto. 
1 II 7. Appellant be.11 ewes that the Lis Pendens would be 
2 helpful to this Court in definitively establishing the undisputed 
3 fact it was recorded and that it concerned the subject seven 
4 acres. 
5 8. In her Kep.ly Brief of Appellant, the Personal 
6 Representative argues that the recorded Lis Pendens gave 
7 Snyderville West r;orit>i rvrntivi,' notice of the pendency of this 
8 action affecting its equitable title to the seven acres, and that 
9 together with the actual notice Snyderville West had through its 
10 managing partner, James R. Gaddis, Snyderville West is bound by 
11 the results set forth in the January 17, 1986 Judgment 
12 I DATED: February 2G, 1990. 
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Mailed a true and correct copy of this Motion to 
Supplement Record to: 
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William B. Wray, Jr. 
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ROBERT F . ORTON 
T . RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN. ORTON & LILJENOUIST 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN. FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
'.j ;'.: nvt hcnd and affixed my 
, AVrA^__£ 
<A....'o; Cohny Recorder 
Entry No 204486 
Book M < P ^ 7 Pago **C'<\ 
HEOUEST Or lf?Jij^j(-~J»- O^fc^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN W. MAJOR, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah 
Corporation; PARK CITY UTAH 
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, 
CHARLES E. HIRSCH; HAROLD D. 
HIRSCH; SAM A. HEPNER, EUGENE H. 
POWERT; MASASHI HASHIDA; J. E. 
ROBERTS a/k/a JACK E. ROBERTS, 
FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a Utah 
Limited Partnership; J. L. 
KROFCHECK a/k/a JOSEPH L. 
KROFCHECK; ROBERT L. BARRETT; 
SNYDERVILLE WEST; PARTNERSHIP 
INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, INC., a 
Corporation; PARK WEST WATER 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit 
Corporation; HALBET ENGINEERING, 
INC., a California Corporation; 
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; MAJOR-BLAKENEY 
CORPORATION, a California 
LIS PENDENS 
C i v i l No. 7336 
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Corporation; ASPEN GROVE, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; LESTER F. 
HEWLETT, JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT; 
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a Utah 
Limited Partnership; H. E. BABCOCK 
and J. E. ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST 
LAND COMPANY, INVESTOR ASSOCIATES, 
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unincorpor-
ated Association; WILLIAM S. 
RICHARDS; MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND 
LOAN COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; 
J- ROBERT WEST; LIFE RESOURCES, 
INC., an Oregon Corporation; KARL 
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN, 
TRUSTEE; PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah 
Corporation; WAYLAND P. CALKINS; 
BARBARA CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Trustee, AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES 
OF UTAH, INC., a Utah Corporation; 
JOHN CANEPARI; KERRY D. BODILY; 
SKI PARK CITY WEST, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; NATIONAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah Corpor-
ation; ENSIGN COMPANY, a California 
Limited Partnership; ROBERT W. 
ENSIGN? CITY DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, a Corporation; 
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR LOTT 
a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT; UTAH TITLE 
& ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation; PARK WEST ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah General Partnership; JAMES 
WEBSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a JAY 
BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER STILLWELL; 
DIANA L. LESUEUR; A. J. SLAGEL 
a/k/a ZELLA J. SLAGEL; RAY WINN; 
JOHN MULLER; GERALD W. WALTERS; 
NEW YORK INVESTORS, INC., d New 
York Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK; 
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA KROFCHECK; 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 24, Inclusive; 
and all other persons unknown 
claiming any right, title, or 
B00KM2 57PAGE23 7 
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li 
i 
I 
II 
II 
|| interest in or lien against the real 
property described in Plaintiff's 
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's 
ownership or clouding his title 
I thereto; PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION, 
j a Utah Corporation; CITY DEVELOPMENT 
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation; 
STANDARD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; GREAT 
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a 
I California Corporation; INN 
I INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE 
I INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah Corporation; 
j REESE HOWELL; AMERICAN SAVINGS & 
j LOAN, a Utah Corporation; JOE COX; 
JIM GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY 
WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 2 5 through 
50, Inclusive, 
U Defendants. 
TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that an action has been commenced 
in the above-entitled Court, by the above-named Plaintiff against 
the above-named Defendants, which suit is now pending; that one of 
the objects of said suit is to quiet title in the Estate of Robert 
W. Major, Jr., Deceased, to real property situated in Summit 
County, State of Utah, specifically described in Exhibit "A" which 
is attached hereto. 
DATED THIS 5J£. day of April, 1983. 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On this S^fo? day of April, 1983, personally appeared 
before me ROBERT F. ORTON, signer of the foregoing Instrument, 
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
E 4'/''% \ NOTARY PUBLIC 
£'"*. 
  (/0 > Z ~ 1 _ * _ 
Residing at: BMUtt/\0LA^ nu^ETj 
^fi^COM&ESSION EXPIRES: 
f io 1 •• ^ J 
« > - * : 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Parcel No, 1: 
Lot A, Lots 18 thru 19, 22 thru 24, 28 thru 38, PARK CITY WEST SUBDIVISION 
NO. 1, according to the official plat thereof on file and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, State of Utah. 
Parcel No. 2; 
Lots 1 thru A,, 17 thru 25, PARK CITY VEST SUBDIVISION NO. 2, according to the 
official plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the Summit County 
Recorder, State of Utah. Also, THE MALL, PARK CITY WEST SUBDIVISION NO. 2. 
Parcel No. 3: 
In Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
Beginning at a point which is the NW corner of property conveyed to Spencer 
Osborne et ux., in a Special Warranty Deed recorded March 31, 1969, as Entry 
No. 108801, in Book M-20, page 389, O.R., said point being on the North line of 
said Section 1; thence West along said section line 432 feet; thence South 1° 
50* East 715 feet; thence East 410 feet, more or less, to a point which is 
directly South of the aforesaid beginning point; thence North in a straight 
line to the said point of beginning 713 feet, more or less. TOGETHER,WITH 
an Easement for ingress, egress and underground utilities as set forth in the 
.first paragraph on page 5 of that certain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as 
Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages 269-276, on July 26, 1971. 
Parcel No. 4; 
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
The North 165 feet of the SW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 o£ Section 36; 
and the South 1/2 of the NW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 36; 
and the West 100 feet of the N 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 
of Section 36; and the North 330 feet of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 
1/4 of Section 36. TOGETHER WITH an Easement for ingress, egress and under-
ground utilities as set forth in the second paragraph on page 5 of that cer-
tain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages 
269-276, on July 26, 1971. 
Parcel No. 5t 
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 
North along the East line of said Plat No. 2 for 204 feet; thence East 160 
fret; thence South 204.00 feet; thence in a straight line West to the point of 
beginning. TOGETHER WITH an Easement 27.6 feet wide for ingress, egress and 
underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of a ccnt.er-
line commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the Southeast corner of 
Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 680.6 feet North, more or Jess, to 
a right of way south line, which right of way is known as "Major Drive" within 
said Park City West Plat No. 2, connecting with Park City t/est Plat No. 1, said 
plats being recorded subdivision in the Summit County records. 
Parcel No. 6: 
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, 
part of the iNorthwest quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, and 
part of Northeast quarter of Section 1, Township 2 SouLh, Range 3 East ot rhe 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian described as follows: Beginning at the Southwest 
corner of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meri-
dian, Summit County, Utah, and running thence North along Section line 502.3 
feet: thence East 850.00 feet; thence SOULII 138.00 feet; thence West 482.80 
Porc.cl No. 7: 
•
 n .-,,-t-or o/ Section 36, Township 1 South, 
Parcel No- 8* 
•
 f , „ r h a i f of the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter 
s%rr»: &strr£2. LS r«.. ^  — «. - *.«.-. 
Parcel Ko. 9: 
T* / r«-r ciir Lake Base and Meridian, 
X. Section 31. Township 1 South g n j . * - . J ^ U ^ ^ ^ ., 
Becinnins at a point on the v.est iin Southwest corner of said 
feet Sorth and 1,412-0 feet. •• « " J ^ U fc« i of Hi6hway 248 for 383.5 
ssrit ssr^T^-*«7 »o—s ^  -
 5u«. —or lM.. 
to the point of beginning hereof. 
Parcel No. 10 s 
„ i j,-_„ Parrel Number 1 and Parcel Number 2 , 
The right of way - f - s ^ ; ^ l
 n ^ n t y Deed recorded as Entry No. 
contained and described in £ a C « ^ £
 o n D e c e L r 19 . 1968 fl 9:25 A.H., O.K. 
108283, in Boole M-19, at Pages xu x^» 
Parcel Ho> 11: 
^^ «<rh a nerDetual 76 foot easement and r i g h t Al l of the rea l property, together J ^ W j u ^ ^ ^
 a s 
of way. as contained an d e s c r x d 1 t h a t c ^ ^
 f ^ ^ 
Entry No, 
s contained and aescro-ucu *» -.-- — 
106902, in Book M15, at Page 619, on April 8, 1968, 
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F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Brenda Major Weber, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Snyderville West, et al., 
Defendants and Appellee, 
0CJ-«4)»0 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890599-CA 
F I L E D 
October 19, 1990 
Third District, Summit County 
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Robert F. Orton and Virginia Curtis Lee, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Richard A. Rappaport and William B. Wray, Jr. 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme. 
ORME, Judge: 
This is an appeal by plaintiff Brenda Major Weber1 
challenging interlocutory and final orders setting aside a 
default judgment in favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendant 
S n v r l o r v i l ^ 0 W o c i - ( " ^ n v H o r v i n e N ^ a<! » nsar -Mr hr> a n ar»4- i r>n t -n 
quiet title to real property. This appeal primarily focuses on 
the sufficiency of service of process on Snyderville. 
FACTS 
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major filed a complaint to 
quiet title to eleven parcels of real estate located in Summit 
1. This action was originally brought by Steven W. Major, 
personal representative of the estate of Robert W. Major, Jr< 
During the course of the litigation Steven W. Major died and 
the present plaintiff was named as successor personal 
representative. 
County. Snyderville, a Utah general partnership, and Jim 
Gaddis were two of seventy named defendants*2 Jim Gaddis 
holds a ten-percent interest in Snyderville and is its managing 
partner. 
In 1978, Snyderville purchased from Investor Associates a 
portion of the property at issue in the quiet title action. 
Robert W. Major executed the pertinent real estate contract on 
behalf of Investor Associates. Snyderville took possession of 
the property and made timely payments, with the final payment 
being made on July 20, 1983. In October 1983, Snyderville 
recorded a warranty deed for the property given to it by 
Investor Associates. Snyderville paid property taxes on the 
parcel through October 1987, when it learned that the trial 
court had divested it of title by means of a default judgment 
against it. 
From the time it took possession of the subject property 
in 1978, Snyderville's address had been correctly listed as 
Gaddis*s office address on the Summit County tax records. 
No filing in the appropriate county or state offices 
revealed the name of any individual affiliated with Snyderville 
nor did Snyderville have a telephone directory listing. 
Although Gaddis was served in his individual capacity at his 
office on May 11, 1983, the summons served upon him was 
directed to him individually and made no reference to 
Snyderville except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy 
defendants. The return of service indicated that Gaddis had 
been served personally and did not purport that service on 
Snyderville had been effected through him. By order dated 
December 17, 1983, the trial court allowed service by 
publication upon Snyderville and sixteen other named defendants. 
As a corollary to service by publication, counsel for 
Weber prepared a summons for mailing to Snyderville at its tax 
address, i.e*, Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in Salt 
Lake City. 
2. As may be expected in litigation involving numerous parties 
and several transactions, the facts before the court are 
numerous and complicated. We commend counsel for both parties 
for their succinct presentation of the relevant facts. We 
further note that both parties' careful compliance with Utah R. 
App. P. 24 has assisted the court in efficiently deciding the 
matters before it. Of particular assistance to the court was 
the comprehensive addenda of key documents annexed to the 
briefs. 
The affidavit of mailing listed Snyderville's address as 
"1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly stating the south 
coordinate by fifty blocks. Although there is no such address, 
and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the 
summons directed to Snyderville should have been returned by 
the Postal Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that the 
summons had been returned, although other summonses were 
returned for insufficient postage. The Postal Service does not 
keep records of returned first class mail and it is therefore 
unknown if the mailed summons ever reached Snyderville, Gaddis 
had no recollection of receiving a summons through the mail. 
The trial court entered a default judgment against 
Snyderville on August 29, 1985. In the fall of 1988, 
Snyderville sought to have the judgment set aside. The 
district court determined that there was "no adequate 
explanation . . . [for the] failure to personally serve 
Snyderville West at its known tax address" and set aside the 
judgment. In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss 
premised on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which was 
granted. This appeal followed. 
On appeal, Weber claims that Snyderville was effectively 
served through personal service upon Jim Gaddis or, 
alternatively, that it was properly served by publication. 
Weber also challenges the court's order of dismissal in favor 
of Snyderville as improper under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).3 
PERSONAL SERVICE 
Weber asserts that Gaddis's position as managing partner 
of Snyderville qualified him to receive service of process for 
Snyderville. Weber further claims that service upon Gaddis 
automatically perfected service upon Snyderville by virtue of 
his position as managing partner and his status as a partner. 
We agree that Gaddis was authorized to receive process for 
Snyderville. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5) (service upon a 
3. Weber also claims that, notwithstanding any deficiencies in 
service of process, Snyderville is bound by a stipulation for 
settlement and the judgment entered thereon on January 17, 
1986, by reason of the fact Gaddis, through his own counsel, 
was a party to the stipulation. We find no merit in this 
argument nor in Weber's lis pendens argument, raised for the 
first time in her reply brief. 
partnership shall be effective through service upon managing or 
general agent). However, personal service upon Gaddis did not 
confer jurisdiction over Snyderville* Weber incorrectly 
focuses on Gaddis's capacity, rather than the import of the 
summons served upon him* Any number of agents or partners of 
Snyderville might be authorized to receive service for the 
partnership, yet if no service is ever attempted on the 
partnership no service on it can be perfected.4 
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, 
with our emphasis: "The summons shall contain the . . . names 
. . . of the parties to the action . . . [and] be directed to 
the defendant." Gaddis1s summons was directed to him, not to 
Snyderville. While this might have provided Snyderville with 
constructive or even actual knowledge of the action, the 
insufficiency of process is not thereby cured. See Stone v. 
Hicks, 45 N.C. App, 66, 262 S.E.2d 318, 319 (1980) (where one 
defendant received a summons directed to another defendant, 
service was ineffective on the receiving defendant even though 
the caption listed him as a defendant). See generally 62B Am. 
Jur. 2d Process section 81 (1990). We hold that service of 
process upon Jim Gaddis in his individual capacity did not 
effect service of process upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, 
Snyderville. 
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION 
Rule 4(f)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in 
effect at all times pertinent to this case,5 authorized 
service by publication when personal service is impractical 
because the 
person upon whom service is sought resides 
outside of the state, or has departed from 
the state, or cannot after due diligence 
be found within the state . . . . 
4o Weber's claim that service on Gaddis was adequate to serve 
the partnership is belied by Weber's own course of conduct. If 
she believed Snyderville had been properly served through 
Gaddis there would have been no need to include it in the 
motion seeking leave to serve by publication, in the order 
authorizing publication or in the published summons, nor to 
undertake efforts to mail the published summons to Snyderville. 
5. The comparable rule now appears at Utah R. Civ. P. 4(g). 
The party desiring service of process 
by publication shall file a motion 
verified by the oath of such party or 
someone in his behalf for an order of 
publication. It shall state the facts 
authorizing such service and shall show 
the efforts that have been made to obtain 
personal service within this state . . . . 
The court shall hear the motion ex parte 
and, if satisfied that due diligence has 
been used to obtain personal service 
within this state, or that efforts to 
obtain the same would have been of no 
avail, shall order publication of the 
summons in a newspaper having general 
circulation in the county in which the 
action is pending. 
Rule 4 requires the exercise of "due diligence" to locate 
the defendant before the court may authorize service by 
publication. "Due diligence must be tailored to fit the 
circumstances of each case. It is that diligence which is 
appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is 
reasonably calculated to do so." Parker v. Ross, 117 Utah 417, 
217 P.2d 373, 379 (1950). ££fi also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 
1269, 1277 n.13 (Utah 1987). 
Counsel for Weber was faced with the task of sorting 
through numerous disorganized files containing Robert Major's 
personal and business affairs. Many documents were held by 
family members and former counsel. At the time of trial, 
counsel could not recall whether he had seen any documents 
specifically linking Snyderville and Gaddis or any contracts or 
deeds concerning the conveyance to Snyderville among the 
records he examined. 
Snyderville first came to plaintiffs counsel's attention 
in a June 1982 title report showing Snyderville1s interest. 
In an effort to locate information he considered 
necessary to serve Snyderville, counsel searched in telephone 
directories, motor vehicle files, corporate filings in Utah and 
California, the County Recorder's files in Summit and Salt Lake 
counties, and in postal records. It is apparent, however, that 
Snyderville's address was set forth in the Summit county tax 
records pertaining to the very property in issue. Counsel's 
quest was apparently for the name of a particular individual 
tied to Snyderville through whom service upon Snyderville could 
be perfected. Oddly, however, no inquiry was made by counsel 
at the address disclosed as Snyderville's address in the tax 
records, of which counsel had knowledge no later than October 
1983, nor was any service of process attempted on Snyderville 
at this address.° Had either been done, Weber would readily 
have been able to personally serve Snyderville through Gaddis, 
whose office was the very address stated in the tax records, 
A plaintiff seeking authorization for service by 
publication on a defendant for whom an in-state address is 
known must, at a minimum, make inquiry at that address. Cf. 
Downev State Bank v. Maior-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509 
(Utah 1976) (plaintiff need not exhaust all possibilities where 
there is an effort to serve defendant at the only address 
reasonably known). This requirement is not only a prerequisite 
for satisfying the due diligence prong of Rule 4, but will also 
go a long way in establishing a proper factual record upon 
which the court may base its order for service by publication. 
Service by publication is inappropriate where no personal 
inquiry is made at a last known address within the state.7 
6. Apparently counsel thought that unless he could advise the 
constable of the name and title of a particular person through 
whom Snyderville could be served, he could not appropriately 
seek service of Snyderville at the address of which he was 
aware. A personal visit to the address would presumably have 
elicited such information. But such information is not 
necessarily required. Had counsel simply advised the constable 
to serve Snyderville at its known address, by and through any 
••managing or general agent, or other agent authorized to 
receive service of process . . . .,* Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5), 
one of two things would have happened, either of which would 
have served counsel's purposes. The return would have come 
back indicating service was effected on Snyderville by and 
through its managing partner, Jim Gaddis, in which event 
personal service would be complete, or the return would have 
come back with an "unable to serve" notation, with explanation 
of the constable's failure to locate at the address any person 
having knowledge of Snyderville despite diligent inquiry, in 
which event the entitlement to serve by publication would be 
ironclad given the extensive other efforts exerted by counsel. 
7. We note that any defendant served by publication has 
standing to challenge the sufficiency of service of process, 
Carlson, 740 P.2d at 1271, even where authorized by an order 
which, as here, is not directly attacked. 
Since service by publication on Snyderville was not warranted, 
such service was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over 
Snyderville. See Hustace v. Kapuni, 6 Haw. App. 241, 718 P.2d 
1109, 1116 (1986) (where service by publication is 
insufficient, subsequent default judgment is void ab initio). 
DISMISSAL 
The thrust of Weber's challenge of the ultimate dismissal 
of the complaint as against Snyderville is that the court 
failed to "issue a brief written statement of the ground for 
its decision," as is required on all motions granted under 
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 when the motion is based 
on more than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Weber points 
out that Snyderville advanced arguments for dismissal under 
both Rule 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) and therefore Rule 52(a) is 
applicable. We agree, noting however that Weber did not raise 
this issue below. 
In Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d 
201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we held that failure to protest 
the trial court's apparent noncompliance with Rule 52 at the 
trial level precludes consideration of the omission on 
appeal.8 Weber should have raised the issue with the trial 
8. Without minimizing the importance of the written statement 
required by Rule 52(a), which acquaints both the parties and 
any reviewing court of the trial court's rationale, we note 
that even if the plaintiff had raised the issue of a written 
statement of grounds before the trial court and the court had 
not filed its written statement as required by Rule 52(a), we 
would likely conclude that the omission was harmless error. 
Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(1990) (where trial court did not identify reason for 
dismissal, Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premised on one 
or both of the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss and 
affirmed after considering only one of those grounds, and 
determining it was well-taken); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 
P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (where trial court did not 
state basis for judgment, appellate court considered grounds 
advanced in motion for summary judgment and affirmed upon 
concluding judgment was properly premised on one of such 
grounds); Dover Elev. Co. v. Hill Manoum Investment. 766 P.2d 
424, 426 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where trial court did not 
state basis for judgment on stipulated facts, appellate court 
noted similarity to cross-motions for summary judgment and 
merely noted that "a 'brief written statement of the ground' 
for the court's disposition would have been appropriate"). 
court, thereby giving the court the opportunity to cure the 
problem. 
We may affirm the trial court on any proper ground. 
Rnehner Block Co, v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 
1988)- Thus, if dismissal in this case can be sustained either 
on Rule 12(b)(5) or 12(b)(6) grounds, we will affirm. £f. 
Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co . . 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) 
(where trial court did not identify reason for dismissal, 
Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premised on one or both of 
the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss and affirmed after 
considering only one of those grounds, and determining it was 
well-taken). 
Weber has limited her argument on dismissal insofar as 
premised on Rule 12(b)(5) to an incorporation by reference of 
her arguments that Snyderville was sufficiently served either 
through personal service on Gaddis or by publication. We have 
treated these arguments above and found both to be without 
merit. Given the limited scope of Weber's 12(b)(5) argument, 
it follows that the order of dismissal should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Snyderville West was not properly served either 
personally or by publication, the default judgment entered 
against it was properly set aside. Because Weber has raised no 
argument demonstrating error in dismissal on Rule 12(b)(5) 
grounds, the order of dismissal will not be disturbed. 
Affirmed. 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
This is an appeal by plaintiff Brenda Major 
Weber1 challenging interlocutory and final 
orders setting aside a default judgment in 
favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendant 
Snyderville West ("Snyderville") as a party to 
an action to quiet title to real property. This 
appeal primarily focuses on the sufficiency of 
service of process on Snyderville. 
FACTS 
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major filed a 
complaint to quiet title to eleven parcels of 
real estate located in Summit County. Snyde-
rville, a Utah general partnership, and Jim 
Gaddis were two of seventy named defend-
ants.2 Jim Gaddis holds a ten-percent interest 
in Snyderville and is its managing partner. 
In 1978, Snyderville purchased from Inve-
stor Associates a portion of the property at 
issue in the quiet title action. Robert W. 
Major executed the pertinent real estate cont-
ract on behalf of Investor Associates. Snyde-
rville took possession of the property and 
made timely payments, with the final payment 
being made on July 20, 1983. In October 
1983, Snyderville recorded a warranty deed for 
the property given to it by Investor Associates. 
Snyderville paid property taxes on the parcel 
through October 1987, when it learned that 
the trial court had divested it of title by means 
of a default judgment against it. 
From the time it took possession of the 
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No filing in the appropriate county or state 
offices revealed the name of any individual 
affiliated with Snyderville nor did Snyderville 
have a telephone directory listing. Although 
Gaddis was served in his individual capacity at 
his office on May I I , 1983. the summons 
served upon him was directed to him individ-
ually and made no reference to Snyderville 
except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy 
defendants. The return of service indicated 
that Gaddis had been served personally and 
did not purport that service on Snyderville had 
been effected through him. By order dated 
December 17, 1983, the trial court allowed 
service by publication upon Snyderville and 
sixteen other named defendants. 
As a corollary to service by publication, 
counsel for Weber prepared a summons for 
mailing to Snyderville at its tax address, i.e., 
Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in 
Salt Lake City. 
The affidavit of mailing listed Snyderville's 
address as "1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly 
stating the south coordinate by fifty blocks. 
Although there is no such address, and, acc-
ording to a Postal Service supervisor's affid-
avit, the summons directed to Snyderville 
should have been returned by the Postal 
Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that 
the summons had been returned, although 
other summonses were returned for insuffic-
ient postage. The Postal Service does not keep 
records of returned first class mail and it is 
therefore unknown if the mailed summons 
ever reached Snyderville. Gaddis had no rec-
ollection of receiving a summons through the 
mail. 
The trial court entered a default judgment 
against Snyderville on August 29, 1985. In the 
fall of 1988, Snyderville sought to have the 
judgment set aside. The district court deter-
mined that there was "no adequate explana-
tion ... (for the] failure to personally serve 
Snyderville West at its known tax address" 
and set aside the judgment. In 1989, Snyder-
ville filed a Motion to Dismiss premised on 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which 
was granted. This appeal followed. 
On appeal, Weber claims that Snyderville 
was effectively served through personal service 
upon Jim Gaddis or, alternatively, that it was 
properly served by publication. Weber also 
challenges the court's order of dismissal in 
favor of Snyderville as improper under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a)* 
PERSONAL SERVICE 
Weber asserts that Gaddis's position as 
managing partner of Snyderville qualified him 
to receive service of process for Snyderville. 
Weber further claims that service upon Gaddis 
automatically perfected service upon Snyder-
for Snyderville. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(! 
(service upon a partnership shall be effectiv 
through service upon managing or gener; 
agent). However, personal service upo 
Gaddis did not confer jurisdiction over Snj 
derville. Weber incorrectly focuses o 
Gaddis's capacity, rather than the import c 
the summons served upon him. Any numbe 
of agents or partners of Snyderville might b 
authorized to receive service for the partnei 
ship, yet if no service is ever attempted on th 
partnership no service on it can be perfected.4 
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce 
dure states, with our emphasis: "The summon 
shall contain the ... names ... of the parties t 
the action ... (and) be directed to the defer: 
dant." Gaddis's summons was directed t< 
him, not to Snyderville. While this might hav 
provided Snyderville with constructive or eve 
actual knowledge of the action, the insuffic 
ency of process is not thereby cured. See Ston 
v. Hicks, 45 N.C. App. 66, 262 S.E.2d 31* 
319 (1980) (where one defendant received 
summons directed to another defendani 
service was ineffective on the receiving def< 
ndant even though the caption listed him as 
defendant). See generally 62B Am. Jur. 2d Pn 
cess section 81 (1990). We hold that servic 
of process upon Jim Gaddis in his individu; 
capacity did not effect service of proce* 
upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, Snyden 
ille. 
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION 
Rule 4 ( 0 0 ) of the Utah Rules of Civ 
Procedure, in effect at all times pertinent t 
this case,5 authorized service by publicatio 
when personal service is impractical becaus 
the 
person upon whom service is sought 
resides outside of the state, or has 
departed from the state, or cannot 
after due diligence be found within 
the s ta te . . . . 
The party desiring service of 
process by publication shall file a 
motion verified by the oath of such 
party or someone in his behalf for 
an order of publication. It shall 
state the facts authorizing such 
service and shall show the efforts 
that have been made to obtain 
personal service within this state .... 
The court shall hear the motion ex 
parte and, if satisfied that due dil-
igence has been used to obtain 
personal service within this state, or 
that efforts to obtain the same 
would have been of no avail, shall 
order publication of the summons 
in a newspaper having general cir-
ulc 4 requires the exercise of "due dilig-
r" to locate the defendant before the court 
' authorize service by publication. "Due 
;ence must be tailored to fit the circumst-
?s of each case. It is that diligence which is 
ropriate to accomplish the end sought and I 
:h is reasonably calculated to do so." Parker 
Ross, 117 Utah 417, 217 P.2d 373, 
(1)50). See also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 
) , 1277 n. 13 (Utah 1987). 
ounsel for Weber was faced with the task 
orting through numerous disorganized files 
taining Robert Major's personal and bus-
s affairs. Many documents were held by 
ily members and former counsel. At the 
* of trial, counsel could not recall whether 
lad seen any documents specifically linking 
derville and Gaddis or any contracts or 
ds concerning the conveyance to Snyderv-
among the records he examined, 
nydervil le first came to p la in t i f f ' s 
nsel's attention in a June 1982 title report 
wing Snyderville's interest. 
n an effort to locate information he cons-
ed necessary to serve Snyderville, counsel 
rched in telephone directories, motor 
icle files, corporate filings in Utah and 
ifornia. the County Recorder's files in 
nmit and Salt Lake counties, and in postal 
>rds. It is apparent, however, that Snyde-
le's address was set forth in the Summit 
nty tax records pertaining to the very 
perty in issue. Counsel's quest was appa-
tly for the name of a particular individual 
I to Snyderville through whom service upon 
^derville could be perfected. Oddly, 
vever, no inquiry was made by counsel at 
address disclosed as Snyderville's address 
the tax records, of which counsel had 
>wledge no later than October 1983, nor 
» any service of process attempted on Sny-
ville at this address.' Had either been done, 
ber would readily have been able to pers-
illy serve Snyderville through Gaddis, 
ose office was the very address stated in the 
records. 
^ plaintiff seeking authorization for service 
publication on a defendant for whom an in-
e address is known must, at a minimum, 
Vc inquiry at that address. Cf. Downey 
te Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545 
!d 507, 509 (Utah 1976) (plaintiff need not 
taust all possibilities where there is an effort 
serve defendant at the only address reaso-
ily known). This requirement is not only a 
requisite for satisfying the due diligence 
ing of Rule 4, but will also go a long way 
establishing a proper factual record upon 
ich the court may base its order for service 
publication. Service by publication is ina-
ropriate where no personal inquiry is made 
- i . . . i .~~ . . .~ »,i^».-^-. . . . :*u:_ *u~ „.~»-. i c : n , . A 
confer jurisdiction over Snyderville. See 
Hustace v. Kapuni, 6 Haw. App. 241, 718 
P.2d 1109, 1116 (1986) (where service by 
publication is insufficient, subsequent default 
judgment is void ab initio). 
CONCLUSION 
Because Snyderville West was not properly 
served either personally or by publication, the 
default judgment entered against it was pro-
perly set aside. Because Weber has raised no 
argument demonstrating error in dismissal on 
Rule 12(b)(5) grounds, the order of dismissal 
will not be disturbed. Affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
DISMISSAL 
The thrust of Weber's challenge of the 
ultimate dismissal of the complaint as against 
Snyderville is that the court failed to "issue a 
brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision," as is required on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 
and 59 when the motion is based on more 
than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Weber points out that Snyderville advanced 
arguments for dismissal under both Rule 
12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) and therefore Rule 52(a) 
is applicable. We agree, noting however that 
Weber did not raise this issue below. 
In Alford v. Utah League of Cities and 
Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), we held that failure to protest the trial 
court 's apparent noncompliance with Rule 52 
at the trial level precludes consideration of the 
omission on appeal.1 Weber should have 
raised the issue with the trial court, thereby-
giving the court the opportunity to cure the 
problem. 
We may affirm the trial court on any proper 
ground. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Thus, if dis-
missal in this case can be sustained either on 
Rule 12(b)(5) or 12(b)(6) grounds, we will 
affirm. Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) (where trial 
court did not identify reason for dismissal. 
Supreme Court assumed dismissal was prem-
ised on one or both of the grounds advanced 
in motion to dismiss and affirmed after con-
sidering only one of those grounds, and dete-
rmining it was well-taken). 
Weber has limited her argument on dismi-
ssal insofar as premised on Rule 12(b)(5) to an 
incorporation by reference of her arguments 
that Snyderville was sufficiently served either 
through personal service on Gaddis or by 
publication. We have treated these arguments 
above and found both to be without merit. 
Given the limited scope of Weber's 12(b)(5) 
argument, it follows that the order of dismi-
ssal should be affirmed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. This action was originally brought by Steven W. 
Major, personal representative of the estate of 
Robert W. Major, Jr. During the course of the liti-
gation Steven W Major died and the present plai-
ntiff was named as successor personal representa-
tive. 
2. As may be expected in litigation involving num-
erous parties and several transactions, the facts 
before the court are numerous and complicated. We 
commend counsel for both parties for their succinct 
presentation of the relevant facts. We further note 
that both parties' careful compliance with Utah R. 
App. P. 24 has assisted the court in efficiently dec-
iding the matters before it. Of particular assistance 
to the court was the comprehensive addenda of key 
documents annexed to the briefs. 
3. Weber also claims that, notwithstanding any 
deficiencies in service of process, Snyderville is 
bound by a stipulation for settlement and the judg-
ment entered thereon on January 17, 1986, by 
reason of the fact Gaddis, through his own counsel, 
was a party to the stipulation. We find no merit in 
this argument nor in Weber's lis pendens argument, 
raised for the first time in her reply brief. 
4. Weber's claim that service on Gaddis was adeq-
uate to serve the partnership is belied by Weber's 
own course of conduct. If she believed Snyderville 
had been properly served through Gaddis there 
would have been no need to include it in the motion 
seeking leave to serve by publication, in the order 
authorizing publication or in .the published 
summons, nor to undertake efforts to mail the 
published summons to Snyderville. 
5. The comparable rule now appears at Utah R. 
Civ. P. 4(g). 
6. Apparently counsel thought that unless he could 
advise the constable of the name and title of a par-
ticular person through whom Snyderville could be 
served, he could not appropriately seek service of 
Snyderville at the address of which he was aware. A 
personal visit to the address would presumably have 
elicited such information. But such information is 
not necessarily required. Had counsel simply advised 
the constable to serve Snyderville at its known 
address, by and through any "managing or general 
agent, or other agent authorized to receive service of 
process " Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5). one of two 
things would have happened, cither of which would 
have served counsel's purposes. The return would 
have come back indicating service was effected on 
Snyderville by and through its managing partner, 
Jim Gaddis, in which event personal service would 
be complete, or the return would have come back 
with an "unable to serve" notation, with explanation 
of the constable's failure to locate at the address 
any person having knowledge of Snyderville despite 
diligent inquiry, in which event the entitlement to 
serve by publication would be ironclad given the 
extensive other efforts exeried by counsel. 
7. We note that any defendant served by publication 
has standing to challenge the sufficiency of service 
of process, Carlson, 740 P.2d at 1271, even where 
authorized by an order which, as here, is not dire-
ctly attacked. 
8. Without minimizing the importance of the written 
statement required by Rule 52(a), which acquaints 
grounds be I ore the trial court and the court had 
filed its written statement as required by Rule 52 
we would likely conclude that the omission 
harmless error. Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & L> 
Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) (where trial c( 
did not identify reason for dismissal. Supreme Cc 
assumed dismissal was premised on one or both 
the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss 
affirmed after considering only one of tli 
grounds, and determining it was well-taken); Taylc 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 (L 
Ct. App. 1989) (where trial court did not state b 
for judgment, appellate court considered grou 
advanced in motion for summary judgment 
affirmed upon concluding judgment was prop 
premised on one of such grounds); Dover Elev. 
v. Hill Mangum Investment, 766 P.2d 424, 426 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where trial court did not s 
basis for judgment on stipulated facts, appel 
court noted similarity to cross-motions 
summary judgment and merely noted that "a *b 
written statement of the ground' for the coi 
disposition would have been appropriate"). 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
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affirm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff/Appellant Brenda Major Weber (hereinafter, 
"Plaintiff") has filed her Reply Brief of Appellant dated 
February 23, 1990 in this case. As required by Rule 24(c) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the Reply Brief is to be 
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing 
Brief, being the Brief of Respondent dated February 24, 1990 as 
filed by Snyderville West. 
As set forth more fully below, Snyderville West contends 
that the Reply Brief of Appellant should be disregarded or 
stricken in part because the major part of Plaintiff's Reply 
Brief deals with the issue of constructive notice which (a) was 
not raised at the trial level, (b) was not raised in Respondent' s 
Brief, and (c) which is irrelevant. 
Plaintiff's argument of "constructive notice" has not 
previously been raised in this case before the trial court as 
the prior briefs before this court, and therefore Plaintiff is 
not entitled to have its "constructive notice" argument 
considered on appeal. 
Nor was the "constructive notice" argument raised in 
Respondent's Brief and therefore pursuant to Rule 24(c) is not a 
matter which should now be raised. 
The "constructive notice" statute (§78-40.2, U. C. A. ) 
applies only to purchasers subsequent to the recording of a Lis 
Pendens, and Snyderville West purchased the subject real property 
five years prior to the recording of the Lis Pendens. 
I 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" ARGUMENT WAS NOT 
RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT NOR RAISED IN PRIOR BRIEFS 
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL AND THEREFORE THAT 
PORTION OF P L A I N T I F F ' S REPLY BRIEF DEALING WITH 
"CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" SHOULD BE DISREGARDED OR STRICKEN. 
I s s u e s o r o t h e r m a t t e r s not r a i s e d i n t h e p l e a d i n g s nor 
o t h e r w i s e p u t i n i s s u e a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t l e v e l may n o t be r a i s e d 
f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on appea l . S a l t Lake County v. C a r l s t o n , 776 
- 2 -
P. 2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989); James v. Preston, 746 P. 2d 799, 
801 (Utah App. 1987). 
As stated by the court in the James case, 
A matter is sufficiently raised if it 
has been submitted to the trial court and 
the trial court has had the opportunity 
to make findings of fact or law. 
(Citation omitted). "Theories or issues 
which are not apparent or reasonably 
discernable from the pleadings, 
affidavits and exhibits will not be 
considered. " I£. at 801. 
There must be more than mere mention of or allusion to 
the theory or matter in the record of proceedings before the 
trial court. As stated by the Court of Appeals in the James 
case: 
For an issue to be sufficiently raised, 
even if indirectly, it must at least be 
raised to a level of consciousness such 
that the trial judge can consider it. 
Ifl. , at 802. 
Snyderville West' s examination of the record of memoranda 
and arguments presented to the trial court below has failed to 
disclose any reference to the "constructive notice" argument now 
raised by the Plaintiff for the first time in Plaintiff s Reply 
Brief, Further, there was no mention of this issue and argument 
in Plaintiff' s Brief of Appellant. Snyderville West did not 
raise or discuss the question of "constructive notice" in its 
Brief of Respondent. Therefore, this new issue is inappropriate 
pursuant to Rule 24(c) R. Utah Ct. App. Section 78-40-2 of Utah 
Code Annotated, upon which Plaintiff principally relies in her 
Reply Brief, was not cited to or referred to in any previous 
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memoranda or arguments of Plaintiff or of Snyderville West. The 
matter of "constructive notice11 through recordation of the Lis 
Pendens has simply not been an issue in this case. 
It is true that Plaintiff has made several references in 
her Memoranda, both at the trial court level and before this 
court# concerning the existence of the Lis Pendens, for instance 
in the several Statements of Facts as cited by Plaintiff, and on 
page forty-nine of Plaintiff's Brief of Appellant (". . .while 
the Lis Pendens was of record."). But these fleeting and benign 
references to a document incontrovertibly of record in the Summit 
County Recorder' s Office did not constitute by any stretch of the 
imagination the equivalent of raising as an argument or issue the 
matter of "constructive notice" and Section 78-40-2. The matter 
clearly was sufficiently not raised, and therefore should not be 
considered by the Court of Appeals. James v. Preston, I^L. at 
801. 
II 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" ARGUMENT IS 
ERRONEOUS AND IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE, AND THEREFORE 
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED OR STRICKEN BY THIS COURT. 
Snyderville West believes that Plaintiff' s Reply Brief 
sets forth an erroneous and irrelevant argument concerning 
"constrictive notice," which argument under Utah law simply does 
not properly apply to the facts of this case, and that therefore 
Plaintiff s Reply Brief should be disregarded or stricken 
pursuant to Rule 24 (k), R. Utah Ct. App. 
The central thrust of Plaintiff s argument as set forth in 
- 4 -
her Reply Brief is that Snyderville West had "constructive 
notice" on the basis of §78-40-2, U. C. A, , by reason of recording 
of a Lis Pendens in the Summit County Recorder' s Office on April 
11, 1983 (Reply Brief, at page 3, paragraph 9), and that 
therefore (somehow) Snyderville West is bound by the January 17, 
1986 judgment. See, e.g., Plaintiff's "Conclusion" as set forth 
in her Reply Brief, at 16-18. 
But Plaintiff has apparently misunderstood the 
significance and effect of this statute. Snyderville West was 
not a subsequent purchaser after the Lis Pendens was recorded, 
but in fact purchased its interest by Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (and placed a notice thereof of record) in 1978, five 
years before the Lis Pendens was recorded. 
Because Snyderville West had purchased the property prior 
to the recording of the Lis Pendens, the recording of the Lis 
Pendens had no affect whatsoever, and gave no constructive 
notice whatsoever, to Snyderville West. Had Snyderville West 
purchased its interest by contract subsequent to April 11, 1983, 
then pursuant to Section 78-40-2, Snyderville West would be 
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, 
as described in the statute. This is consistent with the purpose 
of the recording statutes and Utah's "Race/Notice" system of 
land title records, which imparts to subsequent purchasers 
knowledge of that which is of record prior to their making their 
purchase. But there is nothing whatsoever in the said statute 
with respect to imparting constructive notice to one who 
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purchased property pursuant to a real estate contract prior to 
the recording of the Lis Pendens. As stated in said statute: 
"from the time of filing such notice for 
record onl y shall a purchaser or 
encumbrancer of the property affected 
thereby be deemed to have constructive 
notice* . . . w (Emphasis added)„ 
Plaintiff correctly/ but irrelevant!y/ notes that case law 
under the "doctrine of Lis Pendens" supports the statutory 
concept of constructive notice to persons subsecruentlv taking an 
interest in that property. See e. g. , Blodgett v. Zions First 
National Bank. 752 P. 2d, 901 (Utah Appc 1988), as referred to 
and quoted in Plaintiff s Reply Brief, at 7-8. 
But under Utah law Snyderville West purchased its real 
property interest in 1978 when it entered into its Uniform Real 
Estate Contract with the seller and commenced making payments 
under the contract- Plaintiff in her Reply Brief attempts to 
get around the 1978 contract purchase of the property by 
Snyderville West by contending, in effect, that Snyderville West 
took its interest in the subject seven acres not in 1978, but in 
1983 when it received its Warranty Deed from Joseph Krofcheck, 
the successor to the 1978 contract seller, in fulfillment of the 
terms of the real estate contract. 
Under Utah law, under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion, equitable title and the right of ownership of the 
property passed upon execution of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract in 1978, and all that the seller thereafter held was a 
personalty interest in the right to receive the contract proceeds 
- 6 -
according to the terms of the contract, coupled with the 
obligation upon completion of the contract to deliver the deed 
confirming title. For that reason, Plaintiff is incorrect in her 
assertion in the paragraph at the bottom of page thirteen, and 
elsewhere, in Plaintiff's Reply Brief that "Snyderville West had 
only an equitable interest in the seven acres and did not qualify 
as a bona fide purchaser who could cut off any earlier legal or 
equitable interest. H 
The doctrine of equitable conversion as applied to the 
purchase and sale of real property under contract is well 
established in Utah law. For instance, in Lach v. Deseret Bank, 
746 P. 2d 802 (Utah App. 1987), the court stated as follows: 
The doctrine of equitable conversion 
provides that "an enforceable executory 
contract of sale [upon which an action 
for specific performance could be 
brought] has the effect of converting the 
interest of the vendor of real property 
to personalty. M Willson v. State Tax 
Commission, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P. 2d 
1298, 1300 (1972) (Quoting All red v. 
Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P. 2d 791, 792 
(1964)). The purchaser acquires the 
equitable interest in the property at 
the moment the contract is created and is 
thereafter treated as the owner of the 
land. Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial 
District Court. 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P. 2d 
739, 741 (1973). I£. , at 805. 
As stated by the court: 
When this agreement was executed, Lach 
became the equitable owner of the 
property and the judgment debtors, the 
Dewsnups, held only a personalty interest 
in the property. The Bank7 s docketing of 
a judgment against the Dewsnups on 
December 12, 1980 [after the execution of 
the earnest money agreement] did not 
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create a judgment lien against the 
property because the Dewsnups did not 
then have a real property interest to 
which the lien could attach. Under the 
uncontroverted facts, and as a matter of 
law, Lach owns the property free from any 
judgment lien in favor of the Bank . .. 
Id. , at 805-806. 
See also, e.g., Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P. 2d 1244 (Utah 
1987). 
The Lach case and the principle of equitable conversion 
discussed and applied therein and in numerous other Utah cases 
have direct applicability to the present case. When Snyderville 
West purchased the subject seven acres in 1978, it became the 
equitable owner of the property, and the seller thereafter, 
including his successor Joseph Krofcheck, did not have a real 
property interest which any subsequent filings such as a Lis 
Pendens could attach. The deliverance of the deed from 
Krofcheck to Snyderville West in 1983 merely constituted 
satisfaction of the obligation under the contract to convey legal 
title once the contract was fully paid off, and there was no 
delivery of a real property interest which the Lis Pendens could 
have affected. 
CONCLUSION 
For not one but three separate reasons, any one of which 
is sufficient, Plaintiff s Reply Brief should be disregarded or 
stricken by this court. 
First, as required by Rule 24(c), R. Utah Ct. App. , reply 
briefs must be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
- 8 -
the opposing brief- But in this instance Plaintiff s Reply Brief 
does not address or purport to answer any new matter set forth in 
Snyderville West' s Brief of Respondent, but instead is 
principally dedicated to arguing a wholly new issue of 
"constructive notice". 
Second/ Rule 24(k), R- Utah Ct. App. , requires that all 
briefs must be free from irrelevant and immaterial matters. But 
Plaintiff' s Reply Brief is concerned principally with Plaintiff s 
new argument concerning "constructive notice," which is a 
spurious and irrelevant argument, immaterial to the outcome of 
this case, since under the doctrine of equitable conversion 
Snyderville West acquired its real property interest in 1978, 
five years prior to the recording of the Lis Pendens, rather than 
subsequent to the recording of the Lis Pendens, the situation 
with which Section 78-40-2 is solely concerned. Plaintiff s 
reliance on the cited statute and the "doctrine of Lis Pendens" 
is simply not applicable in this case. 
Third, Plaintiffs "constructive notice" argument and 
reliance on Section 78-40-2 was not raised prior, either at the 
trial court level or in the prior briefs or arguments before 
this court. Therefore, Plaintiff' s argument is simply not 
entitled to be considered on appeal. For that reason, that 
portion (or all) of Plaintiffs Reply Brief dealing with 
"constructive notice" should be disregarded or stricken. 
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PARK WEST WATER ASSOCIATION, ) 
a Utah Non-Profit Corporation; ) 
HALBET ENGINEERING, INC., a ) 
California Corporation; HALBET ) 
PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah ) 
Corporation; MAJOR-BLAKENEY ) 
CORPORATION, a California ) 
Corporation; ASPEN GROVE, INC., ) 
a Utah Corporation; LESTER F. ) 
HEWLETT, JR.; RUTH BRAZIER ) 
HEWLETT; SNYDERVILLE LAND CC.. ) 
a 'Jtah Limited Partnership; ) 
H. E. BABCOCK and J. E. ROBERTS ) 
d/b a PARKWEST LAND COMPANY: ) 
INVESTOR ASSOCIATES, SYNDICATE, ) 
a Delaware Unincorporated ) 
Association; WILLIAM S. ) 
RICHARDS; MURRAY FIRST THRIFT 
AND LOAN COMPANY, a Utah ) 
Corporation; J. ROBERT WEST i 
LIFE RESOURCES, INC., an Oregon ) 
Corporation; KARL C. LESUS'JR: ) 
H. S. SAPERSTEIN. Trustee; ) 
PEOPLES FINANCE 5 THRIFT 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a 
Utan Corporation; WAYLAND ? ) 
McGHIE LAND TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation; Trustee: AVCO 
FINANCIAL SERVICES OF UTAH, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; JOHN 
CANEPARI; KERRY D. BODILY; SKI 
PARK CITY WEST, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; NATIONAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; ENSIGN COMPANY, a 
California Limited Partnership; 
ROBERT W. ENSIGN; CITY 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Corporation; WESTERN STATES 
TITLE COMPANY, a Utah Corpora-
tion; J. TAYLOR LOTT a/k/a JOHN 
TAYLOR LOTT; UTAH TITLE & 
ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation; PARK WEST 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah General 
Partnership; JAMES WEBSTER 
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a 
JAY BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER 
STILLWELL; DIANA L. LESUEUR; 
Z. J. SLAGEL a/k/a ZELLA J. 
SLAGEL; RAY WINN; JOHN MULLER; 
GERALD W. WALTERS; NEW YORK 
INVESTORS, INC., a New York 
Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK; 
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA KROFCHECK; 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 24, 
Inclusive; and all other persons 
unknown claiming any right, 
title, or interest in or lien 
against the real property 
described in Plaintiff's 
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's 
ownership or clouding his title 
thereto; PARK CITY WEST 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation; 
CITY DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., a 
Utah Corporation; STANDARD 
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; GREAT 
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; INN 
INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE 
INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah 
Corporation; REESE HOWELL; 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN, a Utah 
Corporation; JOE COX; JIM 
GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY 
WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 25 ) 
through 50, Inclusive, ) 
Defendants, ) 
and ) 
SNYDERVILLE WEST, ) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
"BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) is believed to 
be ultimately and finally determinative of this action. That 
statute is set forth in full in the text of the Argument in this 
Reply Brief. 
RECAPITULATION OF UNDISPUTED RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On July 13, 1978, Investor Associates, by and 
through Robert W. Major, Jr. ("Major"), agreed by Uniform Real 
Estate Contract (the 'Contract"x to sell one eight (8) acre 
parcel and one seven (7) acre parce. to Snyderville West. (Brief 
of Appellant, Fact No. 3; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 1) 
2 . The purchase price of the 7-acre parcel was 
$120,000, of which $20,000 was paid on execution of the Contract. 
The oalance was to be paid in semi-annual installments of $12,638 
until July 1, 1383 wnen the entire remaining balance of principal 
and interest was to become due and payable. (Brief of Appellant, 
Fact No. 3; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 2, Addendum "A" hereto) 
3. Major died March 20, 1980. (Brief of Appellant, 
Fact No. 10; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 7) 
4. On about April 20, 1980, Joseph L. Krofchek 
("Krofchek") induced Zella J. Slagel, Major's mother and a member 
of Investor Associates, without authority to execute an Agency 
Agreement appointing Krofchek General Agent of Investor 
Associates. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 11) 
5. On about June 6, 1980, Krofchek, without 
authorization, purportedly transferred to himself by Quit Claim 
Deed all right, title and interest in property belonging to 
Investor Associates. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 12) 
6. On July 7, 1980, the April 20, 1980 Agency 
Agreement and the June 6, 1980 Quit Claim Deed were recorded in 
the office of the Summit County Recorder. (Brief of Appellant, 
Fact No. 13) 
7. Gaddis identified a letter to him dated June 17, 
1980, from a law firm notifying him of Major's death. (Brief of 
Appellant, Fact No. 14) 
8. On April 6, 1983, the Personal Representative 
commenced this quiet title action against fifty (50) John Doe 
defendants and seventy (70) other named defendants to quiet title 
to eleven (11) parcels of land, including the subject seven (7) 
acres. The Personal Representative sought, inter alia 
cancellation of the June 6, 1980 Quit Claim Deed from Investor 
Associates to Krofchek. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 17; Brief 
of Respondent, Fact No. 15) 
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9. On April 11, 1983, the Personal Representative 
caused a Lis Pendens regarding the quiet title action to be 
recorded in the Summit County Recorder's office. (Brief of 
Appellant, Fact No. 18 - Addendum ,fBn) 
10. On May 11, 1983, Gaddis was personally served with 
Summons and Complaint. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 26; Brief 
of Respondent, Facts No. 15 and 17) 
11. On June 21, 1983, attorney Don Strong ("Strong") 
filed an answer on behalf of Gaddis and others. (Brief of 
Appellant, Fact No. 28; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 26) 
12. Gaddis has been the managing partner and "acting 
manager" of Snyderville West, a Utah general partnership, since 
he organized it July 3, 1978 for the sole purpose of buying the 
15 acres at Park West. Gaddis retains his original ten percent 
(10*) interest in Snyderville West. Gaddis has operated 
Snyderville West inconspicuously through his business office at 
1253 East 2100 South in Salt Lake City. (Brief of Appellant, 
Facts No. 5, 6, 7 and 8; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 13) 
13. Cn July 20, 1983, two months after the Lis Pendens 
was recorded, Snyderville West made the final payment of 
$32,210.10 under the Contract. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 16; 
Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 10) 
14. Cn October 26, 1983, more than six months after 
the Lis Pendens was recorded and more than five months -.fter 
Gaddis was served. Krofchek. not Investor Associates, conveyed 
the seven (7) acres by warranty deed to Snyderville West. 
Shortly thereafter, Title Insurance Agency issued Snyderville 
West a policy of title insurance signed by Howell. The Lis 
Pendens was still of record. (Brief of Appellant, Pact No. 29-
Addendum "C" hereto) 
15. Gaddis1 attorney, Strong, personally participated 
in lengthy settlement discussions among the Personal 
Representative and twenty-six of the developer defendants. 
(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 39; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 
27) 
16. On October 2, 1985, Gaddis, through Strong, 
entered into a complex Stipulation for Settlement which vested 
the seven acres in the Personal Representative. Paragraph 18 of 
the Stipulation for Settlement provides: 
18. The parties agree to the entry of 
an Order adjudging and decreeing that 
Snyderville Land Company is the Owner in fee 
simple and entitled to possession of all of 
the real property situated in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and more particularly 
described in Exhibits "P" and "Q" which are 
attached hereto and by this reference made a 
part hereof and that Plaintiff is the owner 
in fee simple and entitled to possession of 
all of the real property situated in Summit 
County, State of Utah, and more particularly 
described in Exhibit "R" which is attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part 
hereof; and further adjudging and decreeing 
that the claims of all other parties to this 
action to any right, title and interest in 
and to said real properties, and any part 
thereof, are without any right whatever and 
that said parties have no right to or 
interest in said real properties, or any part 
thereof. 
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Exhibit "R" incorporates "A" and "B" by reference. The seven 
acres appears as Parcel No. 6 on page 2 of Exhibit "A". (Brief 
of Appellant, Facts No. 40 and 42 - Addendum ,fD" hereto) 
17. On January 17, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting 
title to the seven acres in the Personal Representative. Gaddis1 
attorney approved the Judgment. The Personal Representative 
received none of the proceeds from the "Gaddis sale," the sale of 
the seven acres. (Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 43 - Addendum 
"E") 
(NOTE: Addendum "D" to the Brief of Appellant was 
assembled backward and is reproduced for the Court's convenience 
as Addendum "F" hereto.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When the Lis Pendens was recorded April 11, 1983 and 
when Gaddis was served with process May 11, 1983, Snyderville 
West gained both constructive and actual notice and knowledge of 
this pending litigation affecting Snyderville West's mere 
equitable interest in the seven acres. Nevertheless, Snyderville 
West continued to deal with KrofcheK at its own peril concerning 
property within tne power and control of the trial court. 
Snyderville West had actual and constructive knowledge 
that the Personal representative sought to nave the June 6, 1980 
Quit Claim Teed from Investor Associates to Krofchek cancelled. 
Despite this Knowieage, Snyderville West tcoK Krofchek's Octccer 
26, 1983, Warranty Deed and wrongfully claims good title as the 
result. 
In the Stipulation for Settlement, Gaddis and others 
determined Krofchek had no interest in the seven acres. The 
January 17, 1986 Judgment which Gaddis approved confirmed that 
determination and quieted title to the seven acres in the 
Personal Representative. That Judgment binds Snyderville West as 
a grantee which took Krofchek's interest in the seven acres with 
actual and constructive knowledge that Krofchek1s interest 
therein was subject to whatever disposition the trial court might 
make of it. Snyderville West is bound by the results set forth 
in the Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SNYDERVILLE WEST WAS BOUND BY THE 
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT AND THE 
JANUARY 17, 1986 JUDGMENT ENTERED. 
In Point V of its Brief of Respondent, Snyderville West 
correctly asserts that the Personal Representative made certain 
claims in her arguments before the lower court. The Personal 
Representative claimed that because Gaddis was represented by 
attorney Strong, and because Gaddis claimed an interest in the 
seven acres only through Snyderville West, that Snyderville West 
had actual notice of the results of the action and is bound by 
those results. 
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Snyderville West asserts on page 32 of its Brief of 
Respondent that actual notice of the results of the action is not 
sufficient to bind Snyderville West to the outcome. That 
assertion fails. Snyderville West had actual and constructive 
notice of the action and is bound by the results. 
A. The Doctrine of Lis Pendens in Utah 
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides: 
78-40-2. Lis pendens. 
In any action affecting the title to, or 
the right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative relief 
is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the 
recorder of the county in which the property 
or some part thereof is situated a notice of 
the pendency of the action, containing the 
names of the parties, the object of the 
action or defense, and a description of the 
property in that county affected thereby. 
From the time cf filing such notice for 
record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer 
of the property affected thereby be deemed to 
have constructive notice of the pendency of 
the action, and oniy of its pendency against 
parties designed by their real names. 
In Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901 
(Utah App. 1988), Judge Billings discussed the doctrine of lis 
pendens. 
Under the doctrine of lis pendens, the 
filing of a. lis pendens serves as 
constructive notice to ail persons that the 
rights and interests in tne subject property 
are in dispute. Anyone taking an interest in 
that property ices so at his :r her own 
peril. See Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 
590 P. 2d 1244. 1248 ( Utan 1979); Baanail -. 
Suburbia Land Co, , 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 
1978). Persons who acquire interests in 
property that is subject to a lis pendens are 
bound by the resul ts of the pending 
litigation. Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 
P.2d 1300, 1303 (Utah 1982); see Hidden 
Meadows, 590 P.2d at 1248; Baqnall, 579 P.2d 
at 916; Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905, 907 
(Utah 1975). 
752 P.2d at 906. (Emphasis in original.) 
In Blodqett, this Court affirmed the trial court's 
Order of Judgment of Quiet Title and held that the filing of a 
lis pendens defeated the rights of judgment assignee, where the 
result of the litigation was that the party against whom the 
liens were asserted quit claimed any interest she had in the 
property. 
In Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 590 
P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979), an action for specific performance, the 
Utah Supreme Court explained the consequences that befall a 
grantee who takes property with knowledge the property is the 
subject of on-going litigation. 
The sole purpose of recording a lis 
pendens is to give constructive notice of the 
pendency of proceedings which may be 
derogatory to an owner's title or right to 
possession. One who takes with full 
knowledge that the property taken is the 
subject of on-going litigation acquires oniy 
the grantor's interest therein, subject to 
whatever disposition the court might make cf 
it. 
590 ?.2d at 1248. (Footnotes omitted.) Justice Kali held that 
the lis pendens continued to be effective pending appeai and 
convevances made before the matter was reversed and remanded were 
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null and void. That court affirmed the trial court's 
determination that the lis pendens imparted constructive notice 
to the grantees. That court also affirmed the trial court's 
conclusion that the grantees had actual notice of the appeal and 
hence were charged with knowledge that the judgment upon which 
the conveyances to them were based was subject to reversal. The 
grantees' actual notice was reflected by the fact that one of the 
individual defendants was intertwined with the business entity 
grantees variously as either president, principal or husband of a 
partner. 
Likewise, in Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 
(Utah 1982), a quiet title action, the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that grantees who had both actual and constructive 
notice of pending litigation regarding which a lis pendens had 
been recorded were bound by the results of that suit. Chief 
Justice Hall reiterated the rationale that is the basis for the 
doctrine of lis pendens. 
. . . This Court recently stated: 
The doctrine of lis pendens 
preserves the status quo by keeping 
the subject of the lawsuit within 
the power and control of the court 
until judgment or decree shall be 
entered. The recording of a lis 
pendens serves as a warning to all 
persons that any rights or 
interests they may acquire m the 
Interim are subject to the judgment 
or decree. [Bagnall v. Suburoia 
land Co . , 579 P.2d 914 .1978)] 
TEmpnasis added.] 
In an earlier case, this Court explained: 
The mischief that would follow 
if the parties to an action under 
such circumstances could alienate 
away property which is before the 
court for determination is obvious, 
[Glynn v. Dubin, 13 Utah 2d 163, 
369 P.2d 930 (1962)] 
Accordingly, we have recognized the doctrine 
of lis pendens in a number of recent cases. 
[Bastian v. Cedar Hills Investment & Land 
Co, , Utah, 632 P. 2d 818 (1981); Boyce v. 
Boyce, Utah, 609 P.2d 928 (1980); Hidden 
Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, supra, n. 
1; Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., supra, n. 2; 
Hansen v. Kohler, Utah, 550 P. 2d 186 (1976); 
Harvey v. Sanders, Utah, 534 P.2d 905 
(1975).] 
657 P.2d at 1302. 
As in Hidden Meadows, supra, the grantees' actual 
notice in Tuft was reflected by the fact that two of the 
individual defendants were intertwined with the corporate 
grantees as officers and stockholders. Chief Justice Hall 
concluded: 
. . . In light of the active involvement of 
the Butchers as stockholders and officers m 
both corporations, the Butchers1 knowledge 
concerning the foreclosure suit may fairly be 
imputed to the corporations themselves. This 
actual knowledge concerning the pendency of 
litigation involving the property acquired by 
3ayshore Inn and Federal Leasing subjects 
them to the results of that litigation in the 
same way that the constructive knowledge 
imparted by the lis pendens does. 
Because Baysnore Ir.n and Federal Leasing 
nad both actual and constructive notice of 
the pendency of the foreclosure suit at tne 
time they acquired their successive interests 
in the property, they are bound by the 
1C 
results of that suit. The trial court 
properly quieted title in plaintiff on that 
basis. 
Ibid., p. 1303. (Footnotes omitted.) 
A grantee whose interest in real property is cut off by 
reason of actual and constructive notice of litigation affecting 
title to that property need not be a party to that litigation. 
In Glynn v. Dubin, 369 P.2d 930 (Utah 1962), a partition action, 
the grantee was counsel for the husband in a prior separate 
maintenance action. In that separate maintenance action, the 
wife had recorded a lis pendens identifying the subject property. 
Just hours thereafter, the husband had conveyed the property to 
his counsel in payment of legal fees. After the separate 
maintenance action was concluded, the attorney sued the wife for 
partition and to quiet title. The Utah Supreme Court opined: 
It is our opinion that this property being 
within the jurisdiction of the court, having 
been thus committed to it for the purpose of 
adjudication, Dr. Dubin could not make any 
conveyance thereof except subject to 
adjudication by the court. 
369 ?.2d at 931. That court concluded: 
Inasmuch as the only interest in the 
property he could take by the deed from Dr. 
Dubin was whatever interest the latter 
finally had adjudicated to him, and that 
turned out to be nothing, the trial court 
correctly dismissed his complaint and awarded 
judgment quieting title in said property to 
the defendant. 
In summary, the doctrine of lis pendens in Utah binds 
those parties and non-parties with actual and constructive notice 
of pending litigation affecting title to, or the right to 
possession of, real property to the results of that litigation. 
A grantee with such actual and constructive notice acquires only 
the grantor's interest therein, subject to whatever disposition 
the court might make of it. The mischief that would follow if a 
party to such an action could alienate away property which is 
before the court for determination is obvious in this case. 
Actual and Constructive Notice in this Case 
Snyderville West had actual and constructive notice of 
this litigation affecting title to the seven acres before it took 
Krofchek's October 26, 1983 Warranty Deed. Snyderville West is 
thereby bound to the results of this litigation set forth in the 
Stipulation for Settlement and in the January 17, 1986 Judgment. 
Gaddis was personally served with summons and complaint 
on May 11, 1983. Gaddis was Snyderville West's managing partner 
and "acting manager" at the time. Gaddis' only interest in the 
seven acres derived solely from his ten percent (10%) interest in 
Snyderville West. Gaddis was intertwined with Snyderville West 
in such a manner that his actual knowledge of the pending 
litigation may fairly be imputed to the general partnership. 
On June 21, 1983 Gaddis answered the complaint through 
his attorney, Don Strong. In late 1985, Gaddis, through Strong, 
participated in lengthy settlement negotiations. Those 
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negotiations culminated in Gaddis1 approval, again through 
Strong, of the complex October 2, 1985 Stipulation for 
Settlement. On January 17, 1986, Gaddis similarly approved the 
Judgment which the trial court entered. The Judgment quieted 
title to the seven acres in the Personal Representative. In the 
face of these undisputed facts, Gaddis' claim that it was not 
until October 22, 1987 that Snyderville West learned it no longer 
had any interest in the seven acres is disingenuous to say the 
least. 
As in Hidden Meadows and Tuft, supra, Snyderville West 
had actual notice through its principal Gaddis of the quiet title 
action. Gaddis1 knowledge concerning the suit, as well as his 
approval of the results, may fairly be imputed to Snyderville 
West. This actual knowledge concerning the pendency of 
litigation involving the seven acres subjects Snyderville West to 
the results of that litigation in the same way that the 
constructive knowledge imparted by the April 11, 1983 Lis Pendens 
does. 
Snyderville West had only an executory contract 
interest in the seven acres when Gaddis was personally served May 
11, 1983. Snyderville West still owed about twenty-seven percent 
(27%) of the purchase price, or $32,000. Consequently, at the 
time it received actual notice of the pending litigation through 
Gaddis, Snyderville West had only an equitable interest in the 
seven acres and did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser who 
1 ^  
could cut off any earlier legal or equitable interest. Gregerson 
v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396 (Utah 1983). 
In the April 6, 1983 complaint with which Gaddis was 
served, the Personal Representative sought, inter alia, 
cancellation of the June 6, 1980 Quit Claim Deed from Investor 
Associates to Krofchek. Thus, through service of the complaint 
on Gaddis, Snyderville West had actual notice that any interest 
Krofchek might claim in the seven acres was suspect. 
Nevertheless, on July 20, 1983, Snyderville West made 
the final payment of $32,210.10 under the Contract. On October 
26, 1983, Krofchek, not Investor Associates with whom Snyderville 
West had contracted, conveyed the seven acres to Snyderville 
West. Shortly thereafter, Title Insurance Agency issued 
Snyderville West a policy of title insurance signed by Howell. 
The Stipulation for Settlement and the Judgment which 
eventually resolved all questions ot title both clearly provide 
that title to the seven acres be quieted in the Personal 
Representative. The Judgment provides that M(t)he claims of all 
of the Defendants (including Krofchek) . . . and all claiming by, 
through or under them . . are without any right whatever and 
said parties (including KrofcheK) have no right to or interest in 
said real properties, and any part thereof." (Judgment, 1 3-
Addendum nE" hereto) 
One of the results of the quiet title litigation was 
that Krorchek r a^s determined to have no right to or interest m 
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the seven acres. Snyderville West acquired Krofchek's interest: 
nothing. 
Snyderville West may have a claim for loss arising 
under its title insurance policy or against Krofchek, but it has 
no claim to any right, title or interest in the seven acres 
quieted in the Personal Representative. The trial court erred in 
determining the January 16, 1986 Judgment void as to Snyderville 
West. 
Constructive Notice 
The Lis Pendens pertaining to this action was recorded 
April 11, 1983. In accordance with Section 78-40-2, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953), from the time of filing Snyderville West is deemed 
to have had constructive notice of the pendency of the action 
affecting the seven acres. 
The seven acres appeared as Parcel No. 5 in the Lis 
Pendens as in the complaint. Krofchek is designated as J. L. 
Krofchek a/k/a Joseph 1. Krofchek. The October 26, 1983 Warranty 
Deed to Snyderville West was executed by Joseph L. Krofchek. 
The seven acres were within the power and control of 
the trial court until the January 17, 1986 Judgment was entered. 
Hence, Snyderville West took Krofchek's "interest" in the 
property at its own peril, subject to whatever disposition the 
trial court might make of it. Snyderville West is bound by the 
disposition the trial court made of the seven acres to the 
Personal Representative. 
When it made its final payment of $32,210.10 to Title 
Insurance Agency on July 20, 1983, Snyderville West had actual 
and constructive knowledge that its equitable interest was 
subject to the outcome of the pending litigation. When it took 
Krofchekfs Warranty Deed to the seven acres, Snyderville West had 
actual and constructive knowledge that the Personal 
Representative sought to have the June 6, 1980 Quit Claim Deed 
from Investor Associates to Krofchek cancelled. Nevertheless, 
Snyderville West proceeded at its own peril to join Krofchek in 
alienating away property which was before the trial court for 
disposition. 
Snyderville West's argument that it was never served is 
nothing but elaborate diversionary obfuscation. Through it 
Snyderville West attempts to profit from the mischief it 
participated in creating by alienating away the subject seven 
acres that were before the trial court for determination. That 
attempt must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
At the time this quiet title action was commenced, 
Snyderville West had only an equitable contract interest in the 
seven acres. Through service of the summons and complaint on its 
principal, Gaddis, and through recording of the Lis Pendens, 
Snyderville West had actual and constructive knowledge of the 
pending litigation affecting title to the seven acres. 
Snyderville West also had actual and constructive knowledge that 
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the Personal Representative sought to have the June 6, 1980 Quit 
Claim Deed from Investor Associates to Krofchek cancelled. 
Snyderville West had actual and constructive knowledge 
that Krofchek's interest in the seven acres was suspect. 
Nevertheless, Snyderville West continued to deal with Krofchek at 
its own peril concerning property within the power and control of 
the trial court. 
Inasmuch as the only interest in the seven acres 
Snyderville West could take by the deed from Krofchek was 
whatever interest the latter finally had adjudicated to him, and 
that turned out to be nothing, the trial court erred in setting 
aside the January 17, 1986 Judgment as void with respect to 
Snyderville West. If Snyderville West had had a legal rather 
than equitable interest in the seven acres when this action was 
commenced, the issue of whether Snyderville West was duly served 
with process would be relevant. However, where the Contract 
remained executory, Snyderville West had only an equitable 
interest in the property and the issues of actual and 
constructive notice and knowledge are determinative. It cannot 
be disputed that these issues must be resolved in favor of the 
Personal Representatives and against Snyderville West. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's 
interlocutory Order entered Novemoer 15, 1988, setting aside the 
August 29, 1985. default judgment and the January 17, 1986 final 
Judgment as to Snyderville West. The Court should vacate the 
July 5, 1989 Order dismissing the action as to Snyderville West. 
DATED this 23rd day of February, 1990. 
ROBERTt?. 0RT0N 
VIRGINIA C. LEE 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON 6c GOTTFREDSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Mailed a true and correct copy of this Brief of 
Appellant to: 
Richard A. Rappaport 
William B. Wray, Jr. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Fifth Floor 
525 East First South 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake Cirty, Utah 84147-0008 
2£ 4. postage prepaid this xZ? day of February, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 
A. July 13, 1978 Uniform Real Estate Contract 
B. April 11, 1983 Lis Pendens 
C. October 26, 1983 Warranty Deed from Krofchek to Snyderville 
West 
D. October 2, 1985 Stipulation for Settlement - Relevant 
sections and Exhibits 
E. January 17, 1986 Judgment - Relevant sections and Exhibits 
F. Addendum "D" to Brief of Appellant reproduced in correct 
order 
*^<S !S A u£3/»U.v Sf.C s i - CC^r»^CT !P NOT UN0g»5TCC0 b££K CCMPiTtNT A0VICE-* 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
L THIS AGREEMENT, made in d u p . n u this. f j 
b r an* i»tw«« IMVESTOF AS5CCTrs 
. day of. ,7nly , A. D., 19-
hmtnafter designated as the Seller, and gWPPTyTTTF ' • T ^ a psmfrrwtM n ^ f.Tan-ag CaHHig o f ^ 
fc^-^/t^w ^ . . .1.. »••„.. . / nr< Fast 7700 South. SLC. Utah 8M106 ri87-"i2361 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following descno«d real property, situate in 
ciLTnlt St*.**
 tt/ u»,h_ to-witi unlirrroved land the count/ of . 
_. State of Utah, to-wtt: 
Aooacse 
Mora parncuiariy describe* as follows: p-jrsuant to legal description attached nereto, to wit : 
•n zt&rzzTr POP, DICFESS zz?zzs & i/nLrrizs 
IIICLLTED in the foregoing grant, is an easement for ingress, 
W^ 
far 
(*ye 
stric 
cash 
Ccawenci 
shall b< 
renainir 
eeress and underground utilities, to be used in ccrrron with other 
landowners in the said vicinity, described as follows: 
EEGIMTJTMC at a ccint which is located on the southerly 
boundary line of Park City West Plat No. 1, equidistant 
between the westerly and easterly lines of "Brook Ave." 
depicted en the official olat of said subdivision; 
THENCE, thirty feet (30 ft.) each side of a centerline 
which proceeds Scuth from said ooint of beginning, for 
a distance of 3?1.C0 feet, rrore or less, to the south 
line of the real crccerty parcel described in the said 
foregoing grant nsrein; ccrorising a roadway 50.00 feet 
in width for said curccses first acove senticned. 
Interest 
tire 
Part of the Southwest quarter of Sect: 
qu**_ter Section 6, Township 2 South. • 
low-isnip 2 South, Range 3 East of the 
at '.he Southwest corner of Section 31. 
Summit County, Utah, and running then; 
feet; tnence South 138.00 feet; thencs 
the Southerly boundarv of Seller's la: 
West 2^9.5 feet; thence North 27°28' *• 
a :< 
\*e 
31, Township 1 
:e 4 East and a 
t Lake Base and 
unship 1 South, 
orth along Sect 
st 482.30 feet; 
thence South 57 
: 1C0.6 feet to 
thence North 0°30' East S2.4 feet to rcir.t of beginning. 
South, Range 4 East, part of the Northwest 
part of Northeast quarter of Section 1, 
Meridian described as follows: Beginning 
Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
ion line 502.3 feet; thence East 850.00 
Chence South 0*17'58" East 474.93 feet to 
°30' West 32.3 feet; thence South 81°40* 
the West line of above mentioned Section 6 
j^\,U~ 
> «AWC«U_ MMM« UII|MW VWIIMM. I—!•*«*»« li«l«M**MCl» t/«»«4»la} tei*>«4«»% * » »4I« 4e»V« tft UW « 
t 9 r,y> Pep *nnum and payable in regular monthly installments; provtaed that the agrregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made oy Seller on said loans snail not be greater than eacn instalment payment required 10 o« 
made by the 3uy»>r unaer this contract, ft nen the principal due hereunder has been reouced to the amount of anv such 
loans ana mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above descnoed property 
subject to said loans ana mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer aestres to exercise hu r.xr.t through accelerated payments under this agreement to pav off any oou-
gations outstanding at date of :his agreeoent against said property, it shall be the Buyers ooiigauon to assume and 
pay any penalty wnich may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in resoect 
to obligations against saia property lrcsrred oy setter, after date of this agreement, snaii be paid by setter un>esa 
said obligations are assumed or approver ay buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written recuest of the Seller to make aopiicatzon to a reliable lenuer for a loan of su:h 
amount as can be secured unaer the regulations of said lender and hereoy agTees to aopiy any amount so received uoon 
the purcnase price aoove mentioned, ana *-o execute the papers required and pay one-naif the expenses necessary *n ob-
taining saia loan, the Seller agreeing to ?&f the other one-naif, provided however, that the monthiy payments and 
interest rate required, snail not exceed Ue montnly payments and interest rate as outlined above. 
11. T>e Buyer agrees to pay all taxes ana assessments of every kind and nature wmen are or which may b» assessed 
and whica may become aue on these premises aunng tne life oi this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
none 
here 
here 
and 
^uyer 
ja*e in 
the 
MOP „*£: 
IS ^ 
3 Sa~d Buyer hereov agrees to enter i"* o possession ana pay t*o- sa a descnDed premises the sum of tcta i ~~ 
for 1" acres, urcer rricr Jure lc lg78 -e-crsrcr azree-ent = :g&1£; ^  2t-Qt0CG.r*n » 
( ayaoie at the office 01 Seller his assijrra or orcer • 3 1 2 C . : C 0 CC ZZS~> naVJTg ^ l e a s e d 3 a c r e s t ~ g ~ c : \ 
s tnctiy w h i n the following times to wi • cr. *L2J 2 3 , f 7 " , ^ ~ w a ^ ^ n c ^ ^ ^ , ^ , n f rs ?0 J ^pn n<> > 
cash, the receipt of whicn ia hereoy acknowledged, and the balance of * i n n j n P 0 . 0 0 shall be paid as follows 
CcncDenci-^ July 1, 1Q79, paments equal to $12,D38 00 eacn, including princiDal and nteresc 
shall be oaid semi-an-uallv (Jvuiarv Ut ind Jul/ 1st) until July 1, 1983 when the entire 
remainirg balance or principal and interest shall beccze due and pa/aole 
it Fosaftiaion of said premises snail o« aenverea us su\er arvvx ~~ •—oa day ol . 
4 Sad monthly payment* arc 'o be ace ed /ir3t *o • - • p a r r * : : c ' Verest anc second to *"e ^eduction of -e 
pnnc rax. "tereat shau ne cnar^«*i "-om ^ - ^ •3rg?'?- on ail unpaia portions JI -e 
purc"is» nr-ce at the *-a e or VT**~>W" e r cent ( 9 *" ) ^e* annum Tve 3u / er at lis oow on at an •** —e 
rrav -av amounts in exwC->s of *e rnontm / ->a\-*ents ucon ~e --~a c -a-a-'ce suoject o "e iim aL.ona ot an> rncr-raj-e 
o- cc~ -a— 3v the Bj\e '- "<"••!" assumed s u e M °ss to ce a m ea * -»- .o unpaid pr rv. rai or in pr-TJavment or e+ _re 
l n s t a i ^ e - i s at the eiec c oi "ue surer wr c * *c on must ce "-ace a. _re m e tne excess oa>nient s —aae 
* « understood a~d ae**e°d nat u ue ve e r accept - a v - e " —m *e Bu>er on "is corf-act ie->s than accor" r ? 
*0 • - • .»—~s rieretn rre*" onea nen ov 30 ^0 ~z it "vul n -o *a a <»- -e te rms of -e contract as o *ne ' o r e tu-e 
here - a . «- 3tipuiatea 0" as to anv otner remedies or he set e-
Iw J understooa "at t k e r e presentl> ex « J an ooutrat on asra zs iaid property in 'avor of . 
c n ° with an unpaid balance of 
r r e as of . 
Se le** represents t -at T e r o are no -."-a a ^oec al r,*"'~-^•'-*e',' «—~» taxes coven^c morovemf's *o said or*"n 
lses roT n ne process -> oeinjf ns-alled or * n en nave ocen "or*p e.*^ a-J -ot paid for ou standing a^airst sa d orop 
ert\ ez-*s f he follovurc C " . _ . 
> T e Sailer is ? \ e n twe ODt on to sec--e -»TecJte and -nain-a a ca^s secured b> said prooerty of not to ex^ea »-e 
-hen -n^aid contract -a a^ce he-«-r2er nea- -z " er«»3t a u*» -a e o' -,o 0 exceed ^ pp»-cent 
( - "* zer annj*n a"d na\ioie n 'esr^ a- —ontfh " ' a •^ «»,-_s -*^Mrea *hat f e ae*~ecate •nonkni> mscai-^e^t 
pa r^e'-s -<*qj red to ' ,- ~n u D\ •> ler on i ins snn 1 - e r-*s e* "sn encn r s ^ in <»nt na>r-ent *p ^ui-^ i a ^ 
mace w% -•» DUVPT j r - Kis c - ' ' i c V " ~ nm<- CRI * Te-» -ce- "as been -eu^ed 0 ie amoj"t ^r i^v ? ^T 
^OH^S a.~i "mo"r^aiccs a ^* er ae «"»s o conv»% ar he? J J e- ac*e*s o accept 'itle o "e aoo\e aes«.noed p r o e r ; 
' J 0 -*V* —
 3aia oans a-" *T,or'?a?«»s 
a
 -i -e 3uver ces -»s 0 <"(»"" «e nis r : " " T U C ac-» » n ed **a^ —e-_3 under k s ae-e-rrent 0 *av orf a-- TO 
gatic-s a war line: ^ 1 e of " 3 ae'-^eme^ a<a "i t sa a - -•"" -au be "e o - \ f s 0 <aucn 0 a3sume a^a 
pa a"~ -*"aitv w n c " ~ a / oe e^jircd J7* ~ ""asmer. 'a a -— - DOI cratiors r ""avment pena 1 es n -eg^ect 
o 00 ra o-s against »a a proca*^•^ " c ^ e <°iler a e- a e <~' - s agreement s ail oe paid oy oeher -r ess 
said 3C rat ons are ^««--"ed or a^oroved 2 ""- pr 
"• -^<» 3u \e r a?""« jcon *- "en r"o ?* 0' he Se *- "> -"axe aoot cat on to a -• aoie leruer for a loan o
 u n 
arrou**. as an ne 3e''-'•",' -nder "«» retr a _ 1 ^f ^aid e" e- a^a e-*nv a^-ees to acp / anv amount «o receiv»a „oon 
*e n--^ras»» n r ce acov» -"•ntion*wi and 0 a * - e ,k,e pnp»-* -• >. - ^ a-u Day one na **e exsenses "'ece•^^arv - o 
a in i r r s-a 1 con tne -* er atr-^firs: o pay -e ^tKer ore a ' "OT-ued ^owever "at he monuuy oa>ments a" 1 
n eres: T e -equired « =i 1 not »x~e-pd "he — - - j pa>r"e"-3 a~a rt^-*st rate as out i-ed aoove 
1 'P'e Buyer a c » " o pa> ail taxes a^s assessmenis 0' • »nr t r d and nature "*n en are or -wnicn n y b- asse3«ed 
ard "»-ic- " a v o**corie " <• on •>«»«» prem 3*3 ~~z h<» ' • <->f - a az'*<ment. Tve Sener hereoy covenants ana arrees 
ra t ie-« a-e no asa<33""«nw3 asra rat said pre"* ses •xceot ~e 'oi O T " I ? 
12. The Buver agrees to pa\ tne p n r r date hereof 
13. The Buyer further agre-s to keep a*, ."-surable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com* 
pany acceptable to the Seller m the amour.: of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract. ;r * ^ y *  nnri 
and to assign said insurance to tne Seller as .v.s interests may appear and to deliver the insurance coney to mm/ 
14. In the event the Buver snail default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, tne Seller ma v. at his option, pav said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, tnen tne Buver agrees to repay the Seller upon demand. a_ « c^a sums so advanced 
and paid by him. tog-ether witn interest trereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of *» of one percent per 
month until paid. 
15. Buver agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or cestraetion in or upon 
said premises, and that he wni maintain sa:c premises in good condition. 
16. In the event of a failure to commy «Ttn the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make 
•*M y p 
. a ays thereafter, the anv payment or payments wnen the same srail become due. or within 
Seller, at his option snail have tne followirsr alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have tne rr-.:. upon fauure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five Cirs alter written notice, 
to be released from ait obturations ir. .aw and in equity to convev said propertv, anc a_ payments wnich have 
been made theretofore on tnis contract bv the Buver. shall be forfeited to the Seller as uquioated damages for 
the noii-nerformance of tne contract, and the Buver agrees that the Seller may at h:s or^oo re-enter and take 
possession of said premises without
 teral processes as in its first and former estate, torstaer with ail imorove-
ments and additions mace by the 3u\er thereon, and the said additions and improvements soah remain witn 
the land become the property of :r.e Seller, the Buyer becoming- at once a tenant at *=rui of tne Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, indues? costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at nis option, from resornnff 
to one of the other remedies nereuncer in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have tne right, at r.is ootion, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to c»dare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and ravable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note ana mortgage, and pass 
title to the Buyer suoject tnereto, anc proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, anc nave the propertv sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including- costs and attornev s fees- and the Seller mav have a judgment for anv oeilcencT wmen may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, the Sene- hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall o* immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a receive*- to take possession of said mortgaged propertv and collect tee rents, issues and 
profits therefrom ara appu tne «ame to the payment of the obligation nereunder o- :o.d tne same pursuant 
to order of the court: arc tne Sen*r uoon entrv of judgment of foreclosure, snail be ensued to the possession 
of the said premises cunr.g tne penoc c: redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence oi this agreement. 
18. In the event there are a^v liens or ercumorances against said premises otner than those cerein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event anv nens or encumbrances other than herein provided for snail herttrter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of tne Se»ier, then me 5u>er may, at his option, pay and discharge tne same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining cue hereur.cer in the amount of any sucn payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be rrace. may, at tre option of the Buyer, be suspended until sucn tsne as sucn suspended 
payments shall equal anv sums advanced as aroresaid. 
19. The Seller on recemrg the pavrre~.ts nerem reserved to be paid at the time and in the scanner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to tne 3uyer n~ assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveym? the title to the 
above described premises fre* arc clear of s., encumbrances except as herein .mentioned and exrto: as may nave accrued 
by or tnrough the acts or neg ect of the Buv*r and to furnisn at W expense", a poncy of title .nsjrance in tne amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the >* .e-. an abstract brought to date at time of sale or a; any time during the 
term of this agreement, or a: t.ne of de.nery of deed, at the option of Buver. 
20. It is herebv expressiv understood a-a acreed by the parties hereto that the Buver accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that mere are .no representations, covenants, or agreements between tee parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein scecificallj set forth or attached hereto S e e «-CtISrTJrn H e r e t o 
21. The Buver and Seller eacn agree '."i: srouid they default in anv of the covenants or acreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting pa-:- s-a.i ca\ a». r~«*_s and expenses, including a reasonable attome-s fee. wnich mav arise 
or accrue from enforcing tri« ag-»»'nent o- - eouiining possession of the premises covered ne-eev, o* in pursuing anv 
rem***!; provided hercunair c- or tn»» st-v-ii* of thr Suite of Utah whether sucn rcmcd) i« pursued bv filing a suit 
or otherwise 
22. It is understood thit me stipuiat o-s amresaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors and assitrrs of the T?s~*<:zire par:.e« -*-»to 
IN WITNESS WHERECF me saia rar..es to this agreement have nereunto signed tneir names, tne day and year 
first aoove written. y> / 
Signed m tne presence of f / 
V> 
_zl ,/Z^CXLC 
7 
Seller 
> l l 
:
 - .1 
Buver 
e •: = •! 
O 5 S If 
-"^EI/W r"r~ L"*JTFOFp'? FE-J1 FSTarrE ^* 'T°- r " 
IT IE FITTER AGPZZr, that In connection v/i:h the subject Unifcm 
I a n o p * - ( ? ^o C 0 r , t - o o r c « ^ » ^ r Peal Estate Ccntrac: 
en or before Serrtcrner «?, i l ' / - , tnc 
substituting the carce' "^* crcoertv shown en Exhibit "-" hereto ids 
ied as the "1C.1Z2 acres", in place of the real property er.bracir.r 
acres annexed to tr.e face of the said Uniform Heal Estate Contract. 
FI*HZ-JLR, within 90 days from and af ter any substitution by Buyer 
of the Exhibit !\;M property, referred to above, Euyer shall substitute 
the oarcel cf realty z'r^r^ on Exhibit rfB,! hereto in clace of the said 
Exhibit "-" oroce^t"* "*"* *"~e event the Seller herein accuires naricetadle 
t i t l e to said Exhibit "B" land ccnsr is l ra "1C+- acres1'. 
IT IE ACI'C'.TZTGED Z" the par t ies that the fcreroir^ ri^h' 
substitution are contingent upon Se l l e r ' s current negotiations, 
rtade in good faith, with one Taylor Lott and ?.ee6 Gas kin, result 
in Sel ler ' s acquisition cf the said rea l property delineated cr. 
exhibits. Should Selle*" -ccuire said oarcels decicted en the exr 
hereto, the L'r.ifcrr. Peal Estate Contract shall be transferred t: 
secured cv sucr. """^suitircr 1C acre t rac t oursuant tc tr.e final l*c 
and/cr Caskir. azreernent; and, af ter the Euyer has re r l t t ad not I 
one-half the outstanding t r inc ipa i balance cue, plus izzr'^ed in: 
under the said Vnifcrr. real Estate Contract, Buyer snail be enti 
a release cf tr.e westerly one-ha If cf that 10 acre parcel which 
finally substituted as hereinabove provided. Ctherv/ise, the sue: 
ts c: 
sal : 
- • l o - : - « 
cntract shal l renain un. O f ' < V = ^ - 3 ^ ~ " - ~ - f < 
l*\ day z: July, 1973. 
Co 7 
fVCrT" - PA-P ^ OF 
R <^  E:> <T^3-1 
?c^ i 3 j .Lwfc^r: 
I — JL O O 
N 
S X H B i l 
PARCEL i- r^ 
f7EZi~^Z M 
(3- - o r^ . —_ , 
&. rs. ST ^ 
> w "V - w? O ^ < C-XX t 
- *- -n .- — 
~ a 
-SSC/T. 3 <2? 
v*.. 
6 SQ 
j 7, l a screes ± 
por. P^«T .©P -
TO 70 "A-TTA^f4^D 
p o c u r ^ s K J - r s . 
0} 
•4 
V 
V 
&&& 
Seer. 3 G , T ; S , 
.NCTE: Sellers shall have 
the rignt to lssrove a 
roadway-utility access 
througn the entire prop-
erty shewn hereon, in 
order to provide access 
froa Highway 2W, to the 
land westerly of the 
"17.12 acre" parcel. She 
cose within the buyer's 
boundaries shall be borne 
by the buyer with that 
portion outside buyer's 
land to be beme by the 
sel ler. Seller has the " 
right to advance the costs 
and Install the rcac^ay 
before buyer's develop-
ment, according to buyer's 
master plat (approved by 
County), but buyer n s t 
reizriburse seller for said 
advanced costs within 
SO d2ys after cczaieticrv 
of said izsrovessnts. 
/N 
< r « . - 31 
5PZJCT ? « f e r i i e D 
< T 7 
A J 
0 ' 
, / 
^r 
NJ \ 
gXKt6tT" g 
r ^0»S*.O ' ± 
v o n Arccz^-s ; 
? 
k M T C 
/ fci 
i . ; 
do or-)" 
of that 
which rr-
beinq Er 
Officii : 
•-.n 9-. .-ir:.. rc fJ
 :~crri*r m rod ior Summit County. St-Me of Utah, 
.'•.:.•"! r.:;r\ fcrcwOifo is a full true and correct copy 
^ 
• ( • » 
j \ 
Page J 1.'c 
:. ";V hand and affixed rny 
A 0 . . V ,c_ 
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PtCOROcD J £ ? : at 4 ! 3 £ 
ALAN S F H : G C V . S:J--'.flT COMET-CORDS* # 
IN THE THI'RI.) JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
± 
I? 
\b 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
ST* •:/ ^.\JOR, Icr.v;^ 
- sentative of the Estate of 
i..I W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased, 
r xdiiiLXI f , 
ENGLISH i:,tN CO., i^. , a Utah 
Corporation; PARK CITY UTAH 
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation 
CHARLES E. HIRSCH; HAROLD D. 
HIRSCH; SAM A- HEPNER, EUGENE H. 
POWERT; MASASHI HASHIDA; J. E. 
ROBERTS a/k/a JACK E. ROBERTS, 
FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a Utah 
Limited Partnership; J. L-
KROFCHECK a/k/a JOSEPH L. 
KROFCHECK; ROBERT L. BARRETT; 
SNYDERVILLE WEST; PARTNERSHIP 
INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, INC., a 
Corporation; PARK WEST WATER 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit 
Corporation; HALBET ENGINEERING, 
INC., a California Corporation; 
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; MAJOR-BLAKENEY 
CORPORATION, a California 
L I S PENDENS 
I11 1 I HU Zte*. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Corporation; ASPEN GROVE, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; LESTER F. 
HEWLETT, JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT; 
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO. , a Utah 
Limited Partnership; H. E. BABCOCK 
and J. E. ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST 
LAND COMPANY, INVESTOR ASSOCIATES, 
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unincorpor-
ated Association; WILLIAM S. 
RICHARDS; MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND 
LOAN COMPANY, a Utah Corporation; 
J. ROBERT WEST; LIFE RESOURCES,. 
INC., an Oregon Corporation; KARL 
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN, 
TRUSTEE; PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT 
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah 
Corporation; WAYLAND P. CALKINS; 
BARBARA CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Trustee, AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES 
OF UTAH, INC., a Utah Corporation; 
JOHN CANEPARI; KERRY D. BODILY; 
SKI PARK CITY NEST, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; NATIONAL PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah Corpor-
ation; ENSIGN COMPANY, a California 
Limited Partnership; ROBERT W. 
ENSIGN; CITY DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, a Corporation; 
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR LOTT 
a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT; UTAH TITLE 
& ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation; PARK WEST ASSOCIATES, 
a Utah General Partnership; JAMES 
WEBSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a JAY 
BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER STILLWELL; 
DIANA L. LESUEUR; A. J, SLAGEL 
a/k/a ZELLA J. SLAGEL; RAY WINN; 
JOHN MULLER; GERALD W. WALTERS; 
NEW YORK INVESTORS, INC., a New 
York Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK; 
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA KROFCHECK; 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 24, Inclusive; 
and all other persons unknown 
claiming any right, title, or 
B00KM2 57PAGE23 7 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
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7 
8 
.4 
,
M 0 o 
11 
13-
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
S l A l b 01: J PAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY > ' SAI T 1 \r T ) 
On t h i s ^ 5 ^ ^ day of A p r i l , 1983, p e r s o n a l l y appeared 
be fo re me ROBERT F ORTON, s iqne r Df the to r ego inq I n s t r u m e n t , 
who dul', icknowl edieci to me t h a t he executed t h e same 
"
Afi5rCOMMISSION EXPIRES: 
OF 
frdUj 
"NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at 
idUL*a 
Icr+Jo 
B00KM2 57PAGEZ) ) 
vj" 
F i r t o f r h e S o u t r e s t <,t r r c r of S i f i o i J J " c m s h i p 1 S o u t h , F inge* 4 F a s t
 y 
part Oi the Aorty -est q^prter Section 6, It unship 2 South, Range '» East, and 
p a i t of Northeast quarter of Section 1, Township 2 SouLh, Range 3 Eist ol rhe 
Salt Lake Base ar i Mencinn describ2d as follows. Beginning at the SouthwcGv. 
corner of Section. J l , To-nship 1 South, Kan^e 4 East, Sa l t Lake Base and l l e r i -
d i c a , Suaunic County, Utah, and running thence Nort-h along Section J inc J 0 ? . 3 
foot ; thence Last 850.03 f re t ; thence SOULU 13S.0U feet ; thence West AS?.80 
f e e t ; thence South 0°17'5S" Last 474.93 feet to the Southerly boundary of S o l i d 
I n r J , thence South 57°30' West 32.8 feet ; thence South 01o40* 1'CSL ?99.5 f e e t ; 
\ -,
 e ^ n i , o r r r r r v r r } -, s r o f p ' ' i '»ovo n c n t i o i r I 
interest in or lien against the real 
property described in Plaintiff's 
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's 
ownership or clouding his title 
thereto; PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah Corporation; CITY DEVELOPMENT 
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation; 
STANDARD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; GREAT 
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; INN 
INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE 
INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah Corporation; 
REESE HOWELL; AMERICAN SAVINGS & 
LOAN, a Utah Corporation; JOE COX; 
JIM GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY 
WINKLER; and JOHN ZOES 25 through 
50, Inclusive, 
Defendants. 
TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that an action has been commenced 
in the above-entitled Court, by the above-named Plaintiff against 
the above-named Defendants, which suit is now pending; that one of 
the objects of said suit is to quiet title in the Estate of Robert 
W. Major, Jr., Deceased, to real property situated in Summit 
County, State of Utah, specifically described in Exhibit "A" which 
is attached hereto. 
DATED THIS S ^ day of April, 1983. 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
- 3 -
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Parcel 'No. 7: 
r t c rK,»w oinrter oc Section 36, Township 1 South, 
The Southeast quarter of the Sout u ar ^ . ^
 f e c c ^ ^ 
Rani£>e 3 East, Salt Lake base and p r i d i an , i c , , 
Parcel No. 8: 
T- c rK hnl'f of the West half of the Southwest quarter ot the Southeast q, iarL ir 
Tnc South half of the west nau
 a n d M e r i d i 
, ,f Section 36. Township 1 Sot ith, R mge 3 *.ast, Salt L 
Parcel No- 9;: 
• s-f; « ^ ST.. su ££r»r*s: sir i;-2,T, 
" -
n n i n5 a c * {; " ^ ' „
 rtM nr l p - - r i S C of the Southwest corner of said 
thence East 901 feet; thence North 150 feet; thence East 51 1 f ^ c , more J 
I o the point of beginning, hereof. 
Parcel No. 10: 
, , ,„ p-,rrp,i ?lumber 1 and Parcel Number 2, 
Ih. rKbc of ».y » d « . - » « . »™=^ " S „ ' " " ' T.1 r.cord.d a, Eatry »o. 
Ss^r^*^eK""*«--»»"«• °"°«"b" "• i56s e 9:25 "'•• °-R-
Parcel No. I l l 
of way, as contained and described in u , , - n . M 
I
 l l CrySo. 106902, in Book M15, at Page 619, on. , , . 
vO 
CD 
UJ 
C3 
N J 3 
CD 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
SsaA &.£-. 
.12-5J t ^CO^y 
^tt.ik..,c.d:,,.v i::)p::ic:e .,. \ bo" 'e : oi: I \ecoi (Ier*s Use 
WAF M: :;i! I I ill Ill: E E D 
JOSEPH I KROFCHECK , grantor 
I I ui Angeles „ Count) of Los Angeles, California , SEUa^UtattE 
hereby (j)NVEY and WARRANT t: 
SNYDERVILLE WES I , a Par tnership 
, grantee 
of S a l t Lake City , County of Sal t 1 ske , Stale of Utah 
for the sum of TEN A;,;: :;o/100 AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE C0NSDISRAT10N -DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land In S u nun i t: Comity , Slate of Utah, to-wit: 
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, part • 
of the Northwest quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East and a part of 
Northeast quarter of Section 1, Township 2 South, Ranze 3 East of the Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian described as follows: Beginning at the Southwest comer of Section 
31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Summit County, 
Utah, and running thence North along Section line 502.3 feet; thence East 850.00 
feet; thence South 138.00 feet; thence West 482.80 fs2t; thence South 0°1V5S11 
East 474.93 feet to the Southerly boundary of Seller's land; thence South 57*30f 
West 32.8 feet; thence South 81340' West 299.5 feet; thence North 27°28! West 
100.6 feet to the West line of above mentioned Section 6; thence North 0J30' East 
82.4 feet to point of beginning, 
TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT FOR INGRESS, EGRESS & ttrSERGROl^T UTILITIES, to be us-
in common with other landowners in the said vicinity, described as follows: 
BEGINNING at a point which is located on the Southerly boundary line of Park 
City West Plat No. 1, equidistant between the Westerly and Easterly lines of 
"Brook Ave," depicted on the official plat of said subdivision; Thence thirty 
feet (30 ft.) each side of a centerlire which proceeds South frcoi said point of 
beginning, for a distance of 891.00 feet, core or l = ss, to the South line of the 
real property parcel described in the said foregoing grant herein; comprising a 
roadway 60.00 feet in width for said purposes first irove mentioned. 
WITNESS the hand of slid grantor , this day of 19 
Signed in the pi esence :)£ 
"V • T 
J 
STATE OF lfT^H,^L^.^r-v^.. 
County of ^ . - r? Cf-2^--
On the £• C~C 
personally appeared before me 
tit e s i gr. e r o f tl i i , bt i v < » i r 3 m in 1 c n:. ' " h c :ii i 11 v :ic k no w I ed ged-: o rr.e tha L h e e x ecu I x:l ! h r • 
. j Notary Public 
My commission expires i_lldr:r/.'.^^T— •...: ...LLL-..Residing in . . ~ -T^CZ_ .^ -n^J : -
^Lux -. ORTON - snz4bj 
RTCHAPD DAVIS - #A0836 
A 4, HAHOQN & LILJENQUIST 
TORNEYS FOR PLAINT IFF 
8 8 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTM R CJZR 
Ar L CI- * UTAH H4101 
fElEPHONF ' n ^ < " c - - - —
 n 
' DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, 
Personal Representative 
of the Estate of ROBERT 
W MAJOR, J?., Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a 
Utah "V, r?oration , e t a 1, 
Defendants. 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, 
. ersonal Representai.,. ,. 
*: the Estate of ROBERT 
^AJOR, JR.. . Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
SNYr^:- ILLE LAND CO.,- .:= 
Utah I. ir\ ted Partnership , 
et ai
 t 
Defendants. 
i ' i y \ 1 
HIMILATIUN J i \i< ihTTLEMENT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Plaintiff, Brenda Major Weber, Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., deceased, individually 
and through her attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm of Marsden, 
Orton, Cahoon & Liljenquist; Defendant, Joseph L. Krofcheck, 
also known as J. L. Krofcheck, individually, and Defendants, 
J. L. Krofcheck, also known as Joseph L. Krofcheck, English 
Inn Co., Inc., Park City Utah Corporation, Major-Blakeney 
Corporation, Investor Associates Syndicate, William S. Richards, 
Karl C. Lesueur, Wayland P. Calkins, Barbara Calkins, City 
Development Corporation, Diana L. Lesueur, Z. J. Slagel, also 
known as Zella J. Slagel, Ray Winn, New York Investors, Inc., 
Michael Spurlock, Dorie Spurlock, Maria Krofcheck, City 
Development Company, Inc., Inn Investors, Title Insurance 
Agency, Reese Howell, Joe Cox, Jim Gaddis, Sam Wilson, and 
Henry Winkler, through their attorney, Don R. Strong of the 
firm of Strong & Mitchell; Defendant, Snyderville Land Company, 
through its general partners, Joseph L. Krofcheck and Jack E. 
Roberts, and through its attorney, Don R. Strong of the firm 
of Strong & Mitchell; Defendant, J. E. Roberts, also known as 
Jack E. Roberts; Defendants, H. E. Babcock and J. E. Roberts, 
d/b/a Park West Land Company, Halbet Properties, Inc., and 
Snyderville Properties, Inc., through Jack E. Roberts, their 
president and/or general partner; Defendants, Park West Associate 
- 2 -
James C. Fogg, Walter J. Plumb/ III., and Richard D. Frost, 
1 through their attorney, Walter J. Plumb, III.; and Defendant, 
2 American Savings & Loan Association, through its attorney, 
g Theodore Boyer, Jr., of the firm of Clyde, Pratt & Gibbs, 
A hereby stipulate and agree: 
g WHEREAS, prior to his death, the Decedent, Robert W 
g Major, Jr., claimed, and Brenda Major Weber, as Personal Re-
7 presentative of said Robert W. Major, Jr., now claims, some 
g right, title and interest in and to the real properties located 
9 in Summit County, State of Utah, and more particularly describee 
10 I in Exhibits "A", "BM, and "C" which are attached hereto and by 
H this reference incorporated herein; and 
12 WHEREAS, all of the Defendants above named, with the 
13 exception of American Savings & Loan Association, have hereto-
14 fore claimed some right, title and interest in and to said real 
15 properties, or parts thereof, and each of the following Defendan 
16 now claims some right, title or interest in and to that portion 
17 of said real property which is described in the Exhibit(s) 
18 identified opposite his or its name, which such Exhibits are 
19 attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein, to-wii 
20 EXHIBIT NO. CLAIMANT 
21 "A", "B", "C" Snyderv.ille Land Company 
22 "C" William S. Richards, Trustee, 
I and Park West Land Co. 
23 I 
24 j! - 3 -
EXHIBIT NO. CLAIMANT 
"D" Joseph L. Krofcneck 
ME" Park City Utah Corporation 
"F" Joseph L. Krofcheck 
"G" English Inn Co., Inc. 
"H" Jack E. Roberts, Park West Land 
Co. and Snyderville Properties, Inc 
f,I" Park West Associates 
and 
WHEREAS, on or about the 9th day of June, 1982, 
Defendants, J. E. Roberts, Snyderville Property -5, Inc., Park 
West Land Co., Joseph L. Krofcheck, and Joseph Cox entered into 
an Amended Limited Partnership Agreement amending the Limited 
Partnership Agreement by which Snyderville Land Company, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, was created. By the terms of said agree-
ments, much of the real property described in Exhibits "A" 
through "I", inclusive, was conveyed by Defendant, Joseph L. 
Krofcheck, to Snyderville Land Company, and Defendants, J. E. 
Roberts, Snyderville Properties, Inc., Park West Land Co. 
and Joseph Cox agreed to convey other real properties to said 
Snyderville Land Company; and 
WHEREAS, the ownership of Snyderville Land ompany is 
represented by ONE THOUSAND (1,000) partnership units of which 
- 4 -
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10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Joseph L. Krofcheck owns FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-TWO AND ONE-HALF 
(492.5), Jack E. Roberts, Park West Land Co. and Snyderville 
Properties, Inc., own FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-TWO AND ONE-HALF 
(492.5), and Joseph Cox owns FIFTEEN (15); and 
WHEREAS, Defendant, Frostwood Limited, heretofore 
entered into a written contract to purchase from Defendant, 
Park West Associates, the real property described in Exhibit 
"I" which is attached hereto; and 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
ft II WHEREAS, Frostwood Limited has paid certain cash 
q I sums to Park West Associates on said written contract, a part 
of which sums have in turn been paid by Park West Associates 
to Plaintiff and to Joseph L. Krofcheck, and is currently 
being held in trust by Robert P. Orton and Don R. Strong, 
attorneys for Plaintiff and said Defendant; and 
WHEREAS, Frostwood Limited has defaulted on said 
written contract and has forfeited its interest in and to said 
IQ [J sums being held by said Robert F. Orton and Don R. Strong 
17 and the real property described in Exhibit "I"; and 
18 WHEREAS, Joseph L. Krofcheck owns a general partner-
19 ship interest of approximately TWENTY-ONE PER CENT (21%) in 
20 I Park West Associates; and 
21 WHEREAS, Defendant, American Savings & Loan Asso-
22 ciation, claims no interest in and to the real properties 
23 
24 
- 5 -
described in Exhibits "A" through "I"; and 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to settle -he 
above-captioned actions and all of the issues raised by the 
pleadings on file herein. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
covenants and agreements hereinafter set forth and other good 
and valuable consideration, IT IS AGREED: 
1. Snyderville Land Company shall quit-claim to 
Joseph L. Krofcheck and English Inn Co., Inc., or designee(s), 
all of its right, title and interest in and to that portion 
of the real property described in Exhibit "A" which is a part 
of Park City West, Plat 1, as recorded in the office of the 
recorder of Summit County, State of Utah, and is situated 
East of the East right-of-way line of Brook Avenue, South of 
a line which is 290 feet North of the South boundary line of 
said Park City West, Plat No. 1, and West of State Road 248, 
and which contains six acres, more or less. If, in order to 
satisfy the legal rights, if any, of Richard Giauque, who 
owns or claims to own a tract of land situated South of the tract 
being conveyed to Joseph L. Krofcheck and English Inn Co., Inc., 
as aforesaid, it becomes necessary to provide a non-exclusive 
easement running in a southerly direction from Park West Drive 
- 6 -
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10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
17. Snyderville Land Company and its partners 
represent to Plaintiff that Snyderville Land Company has no 
debts or obligations other than as set forth in said Amended 
Limited Partnership Agreement and any real property taxes 
which have accrued since the formation of said partnership 
and which are, as of the date hereof, unpaid. The parties 
agree that the THIRTY PER CENT (30%) interest in said part-
nership being assigned to Plaintiff, or designee(s), as afore-
said, and all of the properties, both real and personal, ownec 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q | by Snyderville Land Company or to be conveyed or assigned to 
Snyderville Land Company under the provisions of this Stipula-
tion, are free of all liens, encumbrances, charges and defects 
of any kind whatsoever except those hereinabove identified in 
this paragraph numbered 17. All real property taxes which 
have accrued since the formation of said partnership, and whic. 
ig | are unpaid at the date hereof, assessed against the real pro-
16 perty which will be owned by said partnership under the terms 
17 of this agreement, shall be paid from partner contributions 
18 I based on the per cent of total partnership units owned by each 
19 contributing partner. 
20 18. The parties agree to the entry of an Order adjuc 
21 ing and decreeing that Snyderville Land Company is the owner ir 
22 fee simple and entitled to possession of all of the real proper 
23 I situated in Summit County, State of Utah, and more particularly 
24 1 described in Exhibits "P" and "Q" which are attached 
- 14 -
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof and that 
1 Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple and entitled to possession 
2 of all of the real property situated in Summit County, State 
3 of Utah, and more particularly described in Exhibit "R" which 
4 is attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof; 
5 and further adjudging and decreeing that the claims of all 
6 other parties to this action to any right, title and interest in 
7 and to said real properties, and any part thereof, are without 
8 any right whatever and that said parties have no right to or 
9 interest in said real properties, or any part thereof. 
10 19. Each party hereto hereby agrees to execute and 
11 deliver such deeds, assignments, easements and other documents 
12 as cire reasonably necessary to consummate the agreement of the 
13 parties. 
14 I 20. In the event that any party breaches any of 
15 J the terms or conditions of this Stipulation For Settlement 
and any other party brings suit to enforce the same or for 
damages, the prevailing party shall be entitled to a reasonable 
attorney's fee, to be determined by the Court, and the losing 
party agrees to pay the same. 
21. This Agreement is subject to approval by the 
Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 15 -
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Utah, which is supervising the probate of the estate of Robert 
W. Major, Jr., deceased. 
22. Upon approval of this Agreement by the Third 
Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, as 
aforesaid, upon the entry of a judgment or order pursuant to 
the terms hereof, and upon execution and delivery of the 
documents and properties referred to herein, the above-captioned 
actions may be dismissed, except as herein provided. 
DATED this £ ^ day of (f)c'A^ ' 1985' 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
T. RICHARD DAVIS 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & LILJENQUISr 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P\jyyJL^ YilnJM. l\lAtA 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER,/fPersonal 
Representative of line Estate 
of Robert W. Major, Jr., 
deceased 
DON R. STRONG 
STRONG & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Defendants, Joseph 
L. Krofcheck, Snyderville Land 
Company, et al 
jpjSEPff L. KROFCHECK 
- 16 -
SNYDERVILLE LAND COMPANY: 
BY V 
J. E. ROBERTS, General Partner 
JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK^ General 
Partner 
WALTS R^L^-PLUMB, II. 
Attorney for Defendants, Park 
West VAysociates, et al 
^f?d7ffVL 
THEODOKETBOYER, JR. 
CLYDE, PRATT & GIBBS 
Attorneys for Defendant, American 
Savings & Loan Association 
QffUfcUP 
J. E^ROBE^TS, also known as 
JACK'E. ROBERTS 
PARK WEST LAND CO. 
BY ^\Mi/?Sr.P 
J . 'E . /ROBERTS, G e n e r a l P a r t n e r 
- 17 
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HALBET PROPERTIES, INC. 
BY v. 27 ) / A 5? 
President J. ET ROBERTS/ r  
SNYDERVILLE PROPERTIES, INC. 
J./E. ROBERTS/, President 
18 -
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EXHIBIT "R" 
All of the real property situated in Summit County, 
State of Utahf and particularly described in Exhibits "A" 
and "B" which are attached to the Stipulation For Settle-
ment to which this Exhibit "R" is attached. 
EXCEPTING, the tract of land described in paragraph 
numbered 1 of said Stipulation For Settlement which is 
being quit-claimed by Snyderville Land Company to Joseph 
L. Krofcheck and English Inn Co., Inc., and the tracts 
of land described in Exhibits "D\ "E", "F", "G", "H", 
"I", "0", "P" and "Q" which are attached to said Stipula-
tion For Settlement. 
n^oj: 
EXHIBIT MAtr 
Parcel No- 1: 
Lot A, Lots 18 thru 19, 22 thru 24, 28 thru 38, PAPJC CITY irEST SUBDIVISION 
K0„ 1, according to the official plat thereof on file and of record in the 
office of the Summit County Recorder, State of Utah* 
Parcel No, 2: 
Lots 1 thru 4 , 17 thru 2 5 , PARK CITY WEST SUBDIVISION NO, 2 , according to t h e 
o f f i c i a l p la t thereof on f i l e and of record i n the o f f i c e o f the Suirait Count1 
Recorder, S ta te of Utah* Al so , THE HALL, PARK CITY BEST SUBDIVISION UQm 2* 
Parce l No. 3 : 
In Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridianr 
Beginning at a point which is the NW corner of property conveyed to Spencer 
Osborne et ux., in a Special Warranty Deed recorded March 31> 1969, as Entry 
No. 108801, in Book K-20, page 389, O.K., said point being on the North line o 
said fection 1; thence West *:.Iong said section line 432 feet; thence Soutn 1° 
50* East 715 feet; thence East 410 feet, nore or less^ to a point which is 
directly South of the aforesaid beginning point; thence North in a straight 
line to the said point of beginning 713 feet, more or less. TOGETHER WITH 
an Easenent for ingress, egress and underground utilities BS set forth in the 
first paragraph on page 5 of that certain Judgu^nt on Stipulation recorded as 
Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages 269-276, on July 26, 1971. 
Parcel Ko» 4: 
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
The North 155 feet of the SW 1/4 of the KE 1/4 of the SU 1/4 of Section 36; 
and the South 1/2 of the KW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 36; 
and the Vest 100 feet of the.N 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4 
of Section 36; and the North 330 feet of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SU 
1/4 of Section 36 • TOGETHER. WITH an Easecent for ingress, egress and under-
ground utilities as set forth in the second paragraph on page 5 of that cer-
tain Judgnent on Stipulation recorded as Entry Ko* 113601, Book M-32, pages 
269-276, on July 26, 1971. 
Parcel No. 5: 
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian: 
Beginning at the Southeast comer of Lot 25, Park City Uest Plat No. 2; thence 
North along the East line of said Plat No. 2 for 204 feet; thence East 160 
feet; thence South 204.00 feet; thence in a straight line West to the point of 
beginning. TOGETHER WITH an Easement 27.6 feet wide for ingress, egress and 
underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of a center-
line commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the Southeast corner of 
Lot 25, Park City Uest Plat No. 2; thence 6S0.6 feet North, more or less, to 
a right of way south line, which right of way.is known as "Major Drive" within 
said Park City Uest Plat Ko. 2, connecting with Park City UesL Plat Ko. 1. said 
plats bein?. recorded QITV.^^*^*— -•- -• 
Parcel Ko. 6: 
Part of the Southt/est quarter of Section 31, Toimship 1 Sourh, Kange 4 Kast , 
pact of the Koith^est quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Rango* 4 East> and 
part of Kortheas.t quarter of Section 1, Township ? South, Range* 3 East of the 
S a l t Lake Base and Meridian described as fo l lows: Beginning a t the Southwest 
corner of Section 31 , Toi/nship 1 South, Range 4 East , S a l t Lake Base and f i e r i -
d i a n , Sucinit County, Utah, and running thence North along S e c t i o n l i 5 0 2 . 3 
f e e t ; thence East 850.00 f e e t ; thence South 138.00 f e e t ; thence Uest .S2.S0 
f e e t ; thance South 0°17 f5S" East 474.93 feet to the Southerly bounds y of S e l l e r 1 
l and; thence South 57°30 f West 32.8 f e e t ; thence South Sl^'iO* UesL 299.5 f e e t ; 
thence llorch 27028* Uest 100.6 f e e t to the Uest l i n e of t h e above mentioned 
S e c t i o n ; thence North 0o30f. Eai,t 82.4 fee t to the point of b e g i n n i n g . o 
++0 
Parce l ?*o- 7: 
Th** Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Sect ion 36, To*niship 1 South, 
Kanje 3 E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and Meridian, l e s s the North 594.0 f e e t thereof . 
Parce l No. 8: 
The South h a l f o f the Uest h a l f o f the Southwest quarter o f the Southeast quarter 
o f S e c t i o n 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Sa l t Lake Base and Meridian~ 
Parce l Ko, g : 
In Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Beginning at a point on the Uest line of State Highway 248, which point is 2,608.! 
feet North and 1,412.0 feet, more or less, East of the Southwest corner of said 
Section 31; thence Northerly along the said Uest line of Highway 248 for 383.5 
feet; thence Uest 1,412.0 feet, nore or less, to a poin on the Uest line of said 
Section 31; thence South 538.5 feet, nore or less, along said Section 31 Uest lin 
thence East 901 feet; thence North 150 feet; thence East 511 feet, more or less, 
to the point of beginning hereof• 
Parcel No» 10: 
The r i g h t of way and easensnt , inc luding Parcel Nunber 1 and P a r c e l Number 2 , 
conta ined and descr ibed i n that cer ta in Uarranty Deed recorded a s Entry No_ 
108283 , irv Book M-19> a t Pages 195-196, on December 19 , 1968 Q 9x25 AJrU, O.R. 
P a r c e l No. 1 1 : 
M l of the real" property, together with a perpetual 76 foot easement and right 
of way, as contained and described in that certain Uarranty Deed recorded as 
Entry Ko. 106902, in Book M 5 , at Page 619, on April 8, 1968, @ 9:13 A.1I. 
EX "A" P. 2 
0498 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Parcel A - A portion of Section 31, T1S, R4E, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, Utah, as follows: Lots 25, 26, 
and 27 of Park City West Plat No. 1, EXCEPTING from 
said lots the southerly 1.3 feet (which lies within 
a 7 foot easement for utilities. 
Parcel B - Beginning at the Southeast corner of the 
Southwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of the Southeast 
1/4 of Section 36 T1S, R3E, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence North 572.4 feet, thence East 761 
feet, thence South 572.4 feet, thence West 761 feet 
to the point of beginning: 
EXCEPTING therefrom that portion of the aforedescribed 
property which is included within Park City West Plat 
Nc. 7 as recorded (Entry No. 110560) with the Summit 
County Recorder on February 2, 1970. 
Parcel C - Beginning at a point on the Section line 1254 
feet North of the Southwest corner of Section 31, T1S, 
R4E, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence East 850 feet, 
thence South 239.22 feet, thence West 850 feet, thence 
North 239.22 feet to the point of beginning. 
n^oa 
ROBERT F. ORTON - #A248 3 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & LILJENQUIST 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., 
Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a Utah 
Limited Partnership; 
SNYDERVILLE PROPERTIES, IIJC, 
a Utah Corporation; J. E. 
ROBERTS; JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK; 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utan 
Corporation; WILLIAM S. 
RICHARDS, Trustee; NATIONAL 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., a 
i Utan Corporation; PARK WEST 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah General 
Partnership; JAMES C. FOGG; 
WALTER J. PLUMB, III; 
RICHARD D. FROST; and JOHN 
DOES 1 through 24, 
Defendants. 
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., 
Deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
Civil No. 7600 
J 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 7325 
o tr r~ 
U U O 
vs. 
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah 
Corporation; PARK CITY UTAH 
CORPORATION, a Utah Corpor-
ation; SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., 
a Utah Limited Partnership; 
CHARLES E. HIRSCH; HAROLD D. 
HIRSCH; SAM A. HEPNER; EUGENE 
H. POWERT; MASASHI HASHIDA; 
J. E. ROBERTS a/k/a JACK E. 
ROBERTS; FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a 
Utah Limited Partnership; 
J. L. KROFCHECK a/k/a JOSEPH 
L. KROFCHECK; ROBERT L. 
BARRETT; SNYDERVILLE WEST; 
PARTNERSHIP INVESTMENT OF 
COLORADO, INC., a Corporation; 
PARK WEST WATER ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah Non-Profit Corporation; 
HALBET ENGINEERING, INC., a 
California Corporation; 
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Utah Corporation; MAJOR-
BLAKENEY CORPORATION, a 
California Corporation; ASPEN 
GROVE, INC., a Utah Corpor-
ation; LESTER F. HEWLETT, 
JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT; 
H. E. BABCOCK and J. E. 
ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST LAND 
COMPANY; INVESTOR ASSOCIATES 
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unin-
corporated Association; 
WILLIAM S. RICHARDS; MURRAY 
FIRST THRIFT AND LOAN COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation; J. ROBERT 
WEST; LIFE RESOURCES, INC., 
an Oregon Corporation; KARL 
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN, 
Trustee; PEOPLES FINANCE & 
THRIFT COMPANY OF SALT LAKE 
CITY, a Utah Corporation; 
WAYLAND P. CALKINS; BARBARA 
- 2 
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CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE : 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Trustee; AVCO FINANCIAL : 
SERVICES OF UTAH, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; JOHN CANEPARI; 
KERRY D. BODILY; SKI PARK : 
CITY WEST, INC., a Utah 
Corporation; NATIONAL : 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, 
INC., a Utah Corporation; : 
ENSIGN COMPANY, a California 
Limited Partnership; ROBERT 
W. ENSIGN; CITY DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, a Corporation; : 
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR : 
LOTT a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT; 
UTAH TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY,: 
a Utah Corporation; PARK WEST 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah General : 
Partnership; JAMES WEBSTER 
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah : 
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a 
JAY BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER : 
STILLWELL; DIANA L. LESUEUR; 
Z. J. SLAGEL a/k/a ZELLA J. : 
SLAGEL? RAY WINN; JOHN MULLER; 
GERALD W. WALTERS; NEW YORK : 
INVESTORS, INC., a New York 
Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK;: 
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA 
KROFCHECK; JOHN DOES 1 : 
through 24, inclusive; and 
all other persons unknown : 
claiming any right, title or 
interest in or lien against : 
the real property described 
in Plaintiff's Complaint ad- : 
verse to Plaintiff's ownership 
or clouding her title thereto;: 
PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah Corporation; CITY : 
- 3 
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DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., a Utah 
Corporation; STANDARD INVEST-
MENT CORPORATION, a California 
Corporation; GREAT NORTHERN 
LAND CORPORATION, a California 
Corporation; INN INVESTORS, 
a Partnership; TITLE IN-
SURANCE AGENCY, a Utah 
Corporation; REESE HOWELL; 
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN, a 
Utah Corporation; JOE COX; 
JIM GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY 
WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 2 5 
through 50, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff!s Motion For Entry of Final Judgment came 
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, one of the judges of the above-entitled Court, on 
the of January, 1986, Plaintiff being represented 
in Court by her attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm of 
Marsden, Orton, Cahoon & Liljenquist, and none of the Defen-
dants being present in Court nor represented by counsel; and 
this Court, on the 29th day of August, 1985, in the above-
referenced civil action No. 7325, having duly and regularly 
entered Judgment And Order On Plaintiffs Motions For Judgment 
By Default And For Order Adjuding And Decreeing That Parties 
Who Have Filed Disclaimers Have No Interest In Real Properties 
Which Are The Subject Matter Of This Action, adjudging and 
- 4 -
ObSS 
decreeing that neither the following named Defendants, nor 
anyone claiming by, through or under them, has any right to 
or interest in the real properties which are the subject matter 
of said action, to-wit: Eugene H. Powert; Masashi Hashida; 
Robert L. Barrett; Snyderville West; Partnership Investment 
of Colorado, Inc.; Park West Water Association; Halbet Engineering, 
Inc.; Aspen Grove, Inc.; Avco Financial Services of Utah, Inc.; 
John Canepari; Kerry D. Bodily; Ski Park City West, Inc.; 
National Property Management, Inc.; Ensign Company; Robert W. 
Ensign; Ryder Stillwell; John Muller; Park City West Association; 
Standard Investment Corporation; Great Northern Land Corporation; 
Charles E. Hirsch; Harold D. Hirsch; Sam A. Hepner; Lester F. 
Hewlett, Jr.; Ruth Brazier Hewlett; J. Robert West; Life 
Resources, Inc.; H. J. Saperstein, Trustee; Peoples Finance & 
Thrift Company of Salt Lake City; McGhie Land Title Company; 
Western States Title Company; J. Taylor Lott a/k/a John Taylor 
Lott; Utah Title & Abstract Company; James Webster Associates, 
Inc.; Jay Baker d/b/a Jay Baker Electric; and Gerald W. 
Walters, and permanently enjoining said parties from asserting 
any adverse claim to said real properties, and any part thereof, 
and from interferring with the title to and possession and use 
of said real properties by Plaintiff and the heirs of the 
decedent, Robert W. Major, Jr.; and this Court, on the 21st 
- 5 -
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day of November, 1985, in the above-referenced civil action No. 
7325, having entered Judgment And Order On Plaintiff's Motion 
For Order Adjudging And Decreeing That Defendant, First Security 
Financial, As Successor To Murray First Thrift And Loan Company, 
Has No Interest In The Real Properties Which Are The Subject 
Matter Of This Action, adjudging and decreeing that neither the 
Defendant, First Security Financial, as Successor to Murray 
First Thrift and Loan Company, nor anyone claiming by, through 
or under it, has any right to or interest in the real properties 
which are the subject matter of said action and that said 
Defendant, and all claiming by, through and under it, be and are 
hereby permanently enjoined from asserting any adverse claim to 
said real properties, and any part thereof, and from interferring 
with the title to and possession and use of said real properties 
by Plaintiff and the heirs of the decedent, Robert W. Major, Jr.; 
and this Court, on the 29th day of August, 1985, in the above-
referenced civil action No. 7600, having duly and regularly 
entered Judgment And Order On Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment 
By Default, adjudging and decreeing that neither the Defendant, 
National Property Management, Inc., nor any person claiming by, 
through or under it, has any right, title or interest in and to 
the real properties which are the subject matter of said action 
- 6 -
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and permanently enjoining said Defendant from asserting any 
adverse claim to said real property, and any part thereof, and 
from interferring with the title to and the possession and use 
of said real property by Plaintiff and the heirs of the decedent, 
Robert W. Major, Jr.; and the Plaintiff, Brenda Major Weber, 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., 
deceased, and ail of the remainding Defendants named in the 
above-referenced actions having, on the 2nd day of October, 
1985, entered into a Stipulation For Settlement by the terms 
of which all of the issues raised by the pleadings on file 
herein were fully adjusted, compromised and settled and 
by the further terms of which it was agreed that a Final Judgment 
in form and as hereinafter set forth could be entered by this 
Court; and duplicate originals of said Stipulation For Settle-
ment being filed herewith; and this Court which is supervising 
the probate of the estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., deceased, 
Probate No. 2000, having, on the 15th day of November, 1985, 
entered its Order Authorizing Compromise and Settlement of 
Disputed Claims in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
numbered 21 at pages 15 and 16 of said Stipulation For 
Settlement; and no notice of hearing on Plaintiff's Motion For 
Entry of Final Judgment being required by reason of said 
- 7 -
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Judgments and Orders and said Stipulation For Settlement; and 
the Court having reviewed and studied said Stipulation For 
Settlement and the other pleadings and papers on file herein 
and being fully advised in the premises and good cause 
appearing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant, Snyderville Land Co., is the owner 
in fee simple and entitled to possession of all of the real 
property situated in Summit County, State of Utah, and more 
particularly described in Exhibits "A" and "B" which are 
attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
2. Plaintiff, Brenda Major Weber, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., deceased, 
is the owner in fee simple and entitled to possession of all 
of the reaL property situated in Summit County, State of Utah, 
and more particularly described in Exhibit "C" which is 
attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof. 
3. The claims of all of the Defendants named in the 
above and foregoing actions, and all claiming by, through or 
under them, with the exception of Defendant, Snyderville Land 
Co., as aforesaid, to any right, title and interest in and to 
- 8 -
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the real properties described in Exhibits "A", "B", and "C", 
as aforesaid, and any part thereof, are without any right 
whatever and said parties have no right to or interest in said 
real properties, and any part thereof. 
4. Snyderville Land Co. shall immediately quit-
claim to Joseph L. Krofcheck and English Inn Co., Inc., or 
designee(s), all of its right, title and interest in and to 
that portion of the real property described in Exhibits "A11 
and "B" which is a part of Park City West, Plat 1, as recorded 
in the office of the recorder of Summit County, State of Utah, 
and is situated East of the East right-of-way line of Brook 
Avenue, South of a line which is 2 90 feet North of the South 
boundary line of said Park City West, Plat No. 1, and West of 
State Road 224, sometimes referred to in the records of Summit 
County as State Road 248, and which contains six acres, more 
or less. If, in order to satisfy the legal rights, if any, of 
Richard Giauque, who owns or claims to own a tract of land 
situated South of the tract being conveyed to Joseph L. Krofcheck 
and English Inn Co., Inc., as aforesaid, it becomes necessary 
to provide a non-exclusive easement running in a southerly 
direction from Park West Drive to Mr. Giauquefs property, 
Snyderville Land Co. snail CLD so. 
5. All of tne parties who have signed said Stipulation 
- 9 -
and properties referred to herein, the above-captioned actions 
shall, upon application of any party hereto supported by 
proof of execution and delivery, as aforesaid, be dismissed 
except as herein otherwise provided. 
DATED this __J^C^day of January, 1986. 
- 19 -
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The foregoing Judgment is approved as to form and 
content by the undersigned parties, individually and/or through 
counsel, this //) day of January, 1986. 
ROBERT F. ORTON 
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & LILJENQUIST 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DON R. STRONG 
STRONG & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Defendants, Snyder-
ville Land Co,, J. L. Krofcheck, 
also known as Joseph L. Krofcheck, 
English Inn Co., Inc., Park City 
Utah Corporation, Major-Blakeney 
Corporation, Investor Associates 
Syndicate, William S. Richards, 
Karl C. Lesueur, Wayland P. Calkins, 
Barbara Calkins, City Development 
Corporation, Diana L. Lesueur, 
Z. J. Slagel, also known as Zella 
J. Slagel, Ray Winn, New York 
Investors, Inc., Michael Spurlock, 
Dorie Spurlock, Maria Krofcheck, 
City Development Company, Inc., 
Inn Investors, Title Insurance 
Agency, Reese Howell, Joe Cox, 
Jim Gaddis, Sam Wilson and Henry 
Winkler 
/J.JE. ROBERTS 
General Partner 
> 
toTER J. PLUMB, III 
Attorney for Defendants, Park 
West Associates, James C. Fogg, 
Walter J. Plumb, III, and Richard 
D. Frost 
hf cd cx^ Wl'-THEODORE BOYER, JR. 
CLYDE & PRATT 
Attorneys for Defendant, American 
Savings & Loan Association (A 
*L$u3tP 
". EL ROB0RTS, also known as 
FACK E. ROBERTS 
PARK WEST LAND CO. 
C. E. ROBERTS 
General Partner 
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC. 
BY 
BERTS, President 
SNYDERVILLE PROPERTIES, INC. 
BY / \ j r ,{ [wftj 
, 'J. IE7 ROBERTS^ P r e s i d e n t 
k-^-
i 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
PARCEL NO. 1: 
The West 100 feet of the North 1/2 of 
the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter 
of the Southeast quarter of Section 36, Town-
ship 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
TOGETHER WITH, an easement for ingress, 
egress and underground utilities as set forth 
in the second paragraph on page 5 of that 
certain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as 
Entry No, 113601, Book M-32, pages 269-276, 
on July 26, 1971. 
PARCEL NO. 2: 
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 
31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, part of 
the Northwest quarter of Section 6, Township 2 
South, Range 4 East, part of the Northeast 
quarter of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 
3 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian des-
cribed as follows: Beginning at the Southwest 
corner of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Summit County, 
Utah, and running thence North along Section line 
502.3 feet; thence East 850.00 feet; thence 
South 138.00 feet; thence West 482.80 feet; 
thence South 0° 17' 58" East 474.93 feet to the 
Southerly boundary of Seller!s land; thence 
South 57° 30f West 32.8 feet; thence South 81° 
401 West 299.5 feet; thence North 27° 281 West 
100.6 feet to the West line of the above mentioned 
Section; thence North 0° 30f East 82.4 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO, easements of 
record or enforceable in law or equity. 
PARCEL NO. 3; 
The right of way and easement, including 
Parcel Number 1 and Parcel Number 2, contained 
and described in that certain Warranty Deed 
recorded as Entry No. 106283, in Book M-19, at 
pages 195-196, on December 19, 1968 at 9:25 A.M., 
6.R. 
PARCEL NO. 4: 
All of the real property, together with a 
perpetual 76 foot easement and right of way, as 
contained and described in that certain Warranty 
Deed recorded as Entry No, 106902, in Book M15, 
at page 619, on April 8, 1968, at 9:13 A.M. 
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